The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

even being considered.433 The meeting agreed that it would be important to cost each

military option, including both military and “realistic humanitarian” costs.

899. Mr Fernie set out his understanding of Ms Short’s position in an internal email the

following week:

“... HMT have been talking to MOD only about the military costs without taking into

account the costs to the international community of any humanitarian response,

post-Saddam transitional administration and/or reconstruction …”434

900. Ms Short was reported to be “particularly keen” to make clear that DFID could not

find substantial funds for such work from its existing budgets. Mr Fernie explained that

DFID was trying to “cobble together some figures of possible costs – all a bit speculative

… but the point at this stage is to get others in Whitehall thinking about it.”

901. On 3 December, Mr Fernie reported to Dr Nicola Brewer, DFID Director General

Regional Programmes, that there had been no progress in interesting the Cabinet Office

or the Treasury in costing “various scenarios”.435 Mr Drummond and the AHGI had both

given a “clear negative response”. The Cabinet Office position was that if DFID thought

it would incur unaffordable extra costs, it should bid to the Treasury. DFID’s Conflict and

Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) was working up preliminary costings, “but we

currently have no consumer for the product”. Mr Fernie asked how and when to report

back to Ms Short.

902. Dr Brewer replied that she had spoken to Mr Ricketts who had been:

“… slightly more willing to acknowledge that the likely costs … should be factored

into the decision-making process. But I got no sense at all that the FCO would either

push for this or support us in doing so. Their sense is that the Prime Minister’s mind

will be made up by other factors.”436

903. Dr Brewer suggested that the issue be raised with Sir David Manning or other

Permanent Secretaries by Mr Chakrabarti, or at Cabinet by Ms Short.

904. DFID officials reported the lack of progress to Ms Short on 10 December.437

Ms Short agreed that officials should raise US and DFID cost estimates at the next

Cabinet Office meeting, and directed that DFID officials should increase discussions

with the Treasury. It was also important to ensure that all costings included military and

humanitarian factors.

905. At the same meeting, officials raised the need to consider training for DFID-funded

personnel who might be deployed alongside the UK military. Ms Short pointed out that

433 Minute Bewes to Miller, 19 November 2002, ‘Iraq’.

434 Email Fernie to Sparkhall, 26 November 2002, ‘Iraq – expenditure implications across Whitehall’.

435 Minute Fernie to Brewer, 3 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Contingency planning’.

436 Minute Brewer to Fernie, 5 December 2002, ‘Iraq: contingency planning’.

437 Minute Bewes to Fernie, 13 December 2002, ‘Iraq’.

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