The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Lagos was
“In particular … looking for a little more time and a report from
Blix judging
Saddam’s
compliance against specific benchmarks”.
899.
Mr Rycroft
suggested that the three main elements of a strategy could
be:
•
“A
slight change to the draft resolution.” We could
add in explicit references
to the
reports from Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei, concluding that
they confirmed
either that
Saddam Hussein had “failed to comply with, and co-operate fully
in
the
implementation” of resolution 1441, or that Iraq had “failed to
take the final
opportunity”
afforded by the resolution.
•
“Benchmarks.”
Making public “in the next day or so what is required
of
Saddam in
one or more key areas”. The benchmarks would not be set out in
the
resolution
but the date of the vote would provide a deadline for compliance.
That
would allow
Chile to say that “as there is not full compliance”, it would vote
for
the
resolution.
•
“Offer
of exile/amnesty to Saddam.” Making
“clear publicly again that we are
not intent
on war come what may, and that we are determined to explore
every
last avenue
for peace. This includes making clear that we support Arab
attempts
to get
Saddam to leave Iraq and go into exile in exchange for an
amnesty.”278
900.
Mr Blair
produced a handwritten note on 3 March setting out a list of
potential
actions,
including;
•
Setting
Saddam Hussein a deadline of 17 March for disclosure of
documentation
and proof
of destruction.
•
Presenting
the “20 best” scientists for interview outside Iraq, with their
families
identified
and their safety guaranteed.
•
If Saddam
Hussein failed, giving him until 21 March to leave Iraq
with
an agreed amnesty.
•
A
declaration “by the nine/ten [non-permanent members of the Security
Council]”
endorsed by
Canada.
•
A “launch”
following Dr Blix’s report to the Security Council on 7 March
in Chile
or
Mexico.
•
“… trying
to persuade Russia”.
•
Agreeing
a:
{{UN role
in post-conflict Iraq;
{{broad-based
government; and
{{humanitarian
effort.
•
Making “a
last plea to France not to veto but to help”.
•
Publishing
an “analysis of Saddam’s deception alongside the …
declaration”.279
278
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 3 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Securing the
Chilean Vote’.
279
Note
(handwritten) [Blair], 3 March 2003, [untitled].
342