The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The size and
composition of a UK military contribution to the US-led invasion of
Iraq
was largely
discretionary. The US wanted some UK capabilities (including
Special
Forces), to
use UK bases, and the involvement of the UK military to avoid
the
perception
of unilateral US military action. The primary impetus to maximise
the size
of the UK
contribution and the recommendations on its composition came from
the
Armed
Forces, with the agreement of Mr Hoon.
•
The decisions
taken between mid-December 2002 and mid-January 2003 to
increase
the combat
force deployed to three brigades and bring forward the date on
which UK
forces
might participate in combat operations compressed the timescales
available
for
preparation.
•
The decision
to deploy a large scale force for potential combat operations was
taken
without
collective Ministerial consideration of the decision and its
implications.
•
The large
scale force deployed was a one-shot capability. It would have been
difficult
to sustain
the force if combat operations had been delayed until autumn 2003
or
longer, and
it constrained the capabilities which were available for a UK
military
contribution
to post-conflict operations.
3.
The initial
planning for a military invasion of Iraq and the decision on 31
October 2002
to offer
ground forces to the US for planning purposes are addressed in
Section 6.1.
4.
The main
planning assumption throughout 2002 was that the UK would provide
air
and
maritime forces in support of US operations in southern Iraq, but
that UK ground
forces
would be deployed through Turkey for operations in northern
Iraq.
5.
As Section 6.1
sets out, there was no certainty that Turkey would agree to
the
UK
deployment.
6.
Mr Blair had
also been considering a number of issues over the Christmas
holiday
in 2002. On
4 January 2003 he produced a long note to officials in No.10 on a
range
7.
On military
preparations, Mr Blair wrote that there was a need to make sure
that the
military
plan was “viable”; and that he needed a meeting and the “military’s
assurance
that the
plan can work. This is no small undertaking.”
8.
Other points
in the note are addressed in Section 3.6.
1
Note Blair
[to No.10 officials], 4 January 2003, [extract
‘Iraq’].
388