The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
70.
The key points
of the UK position were:
“•
…
scepticism. Iraq has a long history of playing games. The … offer
comes only
four days
after Iraq rejected inspections;
•
Not clear
what, exactly, the Iraqi letter amounts to …
•
Note Iraqi
reference to discussion of practical arrangements for
inspections.
Iraq must
not be allowed to drag this process out. A new UNSCR [UN
Security
Council
resolution] would need to address this point …
•
Offer does
not make clear that Iraq has accepted our basic demand,
namely
to grant
inspectors immediate access to any site, building, records,
personnel
at any
time of UNMOVIC’s choosing …
•
We must
keep up the pressure on Iraq. Their latest offer has only come
because
the
international community has demonstrated its determination to stand
firm.
We must
continue to do so.
•
We must,
therefore, work for a new UNSC resolution …
•
History
tells us that we cannot trust Saddam’s word. This time, our goal is
to
ensure that
he complies with UNSC demands.”
71.
Mr Blair
and President Bush decided to continue to pursue a new
Security
Council
resolution.
72.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed the position on 18
September.21
73.
Mr Blair
said that they should stick to the strategy. A resolution was
needed and
the
inspectors must be allowed in to do their job properly.
Mr Blair was sceptical about
whether
Saddam would comply: “It was obvious that Saddam would play
games.
He had only
made his offer on inspections … because he felt under pressure.”
The
pressure
would need to be continued.
74.
Mr Blair
and President Bush also discussed the need for a new inspections
regime
that was
unconditional and unrestricted. Mr Blair’s view was
that:
“This time
we must be clear that obstruction would mean military action. This
had to
be a
disarmament process. There could be no mindset of accepting
conditions …”
75.
Mr Blair
stated that, in relation to the overall strategy, Saddam Hussein
was “trying
to drag us
into a negotiation”, and that the UN route provided the means to
deprive
him of the
argument that the US would attack him whatever he did.
Mr Blair said that
disarmament
“would occur, either through inspections or military action” and
that the
“choice was
Saddam’s”. In Mr Blair’s view, the Iraqi regime “could crack
with the arrival
of
inspectors”. Keeping up the public pressure would give the
international community
“no option
but to support us”.
21
Letter
Rycroft to Sedwill, 18 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Phone Call with President Bush,
18 September’.
212