4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
coached in
the answers they have to give. Some of them have been removed
from
their homes
and places of work and detained to prevent them from being
interviewed.”
403.
An
assessment of Iraq’s intentions on 6 March concluded that the
strategy
was to play
for time, and that Iraq thought the strategy was
working.
404.
The
Assessments Staff was “confident” that Saddam Hussein’s aim would
be
the
eventual re-creation of his WMD capability.
405.
Mr Miller
provided an assessment of “Saddam’s possible next moves”
for
Sir David
Manning on 6 March.156
The
document was also sent to officials in the FCO,
the MOD and
the Cabinet Office.
406.
Mr Miller
described Saddam Hussein’s strategy as “to play for time,
gradually
releasing
limited information on Iraq’s terms or when there is no other
option”. Iraq
thought its
strategy was working. Mr Miller stated: “Even if he [Saddam
Hussein] does
opt for a
declaration of WMD, we are confident that his aim would be the
eventual
recreation
of his capability.”
407.
Mr Miller
advised that the decision to destroy the Al Samoud 2 missile
was
“indicative
of Saddam’s strategy: a drawn out debate with UNMOVIC over
legality; an
offer to
form a ‘technical committee’ to review the weapon; compliance; and
an attempt
to portray
compliance as a major concession”. Mr Miller predicted that
Iraq would “draw
out the
destruction process”, which might take “as long as two months to
complete”.
408.
Mr Miller
concluded:
“In short,
we have seen no indication that there will be a change in Iraq’s
strategy …
Iraq will
continue to put the onus on the inspectors to set out what they
want rather
than
pro-actively provide information … Saddam will be prepared to offer
further
concessions
– or at least to say he is ready to. But based on current behaviour
any
information
will be incomplete, will be difficult to interpret and will not
represent a
full
declaration of Iraq’s capability. On overseas interviews and any
proposal for
a
substantial UN military force, agreement is likely only in the face
of imminent
military action.”
409.
In his
report to the Security Council on 7 March, Dr Blix stated that
there had
been an
acceleration of initiatives from Iraq since the end of January, but
they
could not
be said to constitute immediate co-operation. Nor did they
necessarily
cover all
areas of relevance; but they were nevertheless
welcome.
410.
Dr Blix and Dr
ElBaradei’s presentations to the Security Council on 7 March,
and
the
subsequent discussion, are described in detail in Section
3.7.
156
Minute
Miller to Manning, 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Potential Compliance with
UNMOVIC’.
365