9.4 | June 2005 to May 2006

of the Security Forces acting illegally and beyond their control and that of the local Chief

of Police or Governor”.

253. Although Lt Gen Brims reported that he and Mr Patey had “made some progress

along these lines” in their meetings with senior Iraqi leaders, there remained concern

about the way the UK had handled events, in particular the fact that the senior figures

in the ITG had not been aware of the UK’s plans for the operation in which two

leading members of a JAM splinter group had been arrested. A member of the ITG

proposed that ground rules should be agreed for covert operations by the MNF, which

Lt Gen Brims considered reasonable.

254. An FCO paper produced some time later, in April 2006, suggested that the UK

recognised at the time of the Jameat incident that:

“… stability [in Basra] was threatened by intense rivalry among political parties and

their militias who had an interest in criminality … At that time, we recognised that our

only real option was to maintain the course we had set and to see the job through.

Asserting direct control over local government and institutions was, and remains, out

of the question. Pulling out of Basra, and leaving a political and security vacuum in a

key strategic area was equally unacceptable.”123

255. On 22 September, a senior government official specialising in the Middle East

wrote to Mr Asquith to explain that an approach had been received:

“… from Muqtada al-Sadr to establish a discreet dialogue with HMG following recent

events in southern Iraq … Subject to your views [a plan was being drawn up] to

meet representatives of al-Sadr in Amman in the near future …

“… the message he had received from al-Sadr was that he wanted to resolve the

current difficulties in southern Iraq. He was prepared to make calming statements

to his people, but could not do so with [JAM1]124 in detention. [JAM1] was important

to him and he needed him to be released. The reaction to events in Basra was

upsetting his preparations for the elections in December. He was prepared to send

senior representatives to Amman to meet British representatives and to discuss what

could be done.”125

256. The response had been that the UK Government could not negotiate over the

detention of JAM1 because:

“We had evidence he was behind recent attacks on British troops in MND(SE) and

linked to Lebanese Hizballah and the Iranians. We also said we were surprised

123 Paper FCO, 27 April 2006, ‘DOP(I): Basra’.

124 The name of this individual has been replaced with the cipher JAM1 throughout the Report, for security

reasons.

125 Minute senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1) to Asquith, 22 September 2005,

‘Overture from Muqtada al-Sadr’.

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