The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
459.
An IPU update
for Mr Blair on 3 September stated:
“In
addition to the senior UK police officers already in Iraq, 15 UK
trainers can be
deployed
within two weeks and another 60 by the end of October. Our target
is
100 UK
trainers deployed by end 2003 (of a planned CPA total of
600).”404
460.
CC Kernaghan
stated in an email to the Home Office that neither ACPO nor
the
Chief
Constable of the MOD police had been approached to deploy the 15
“trainers”
mentioned.405
He also
stated that the FCO had not – at that point – conducted the
risk
assessment
it had promised nor agreed with ACPO that conditions were right to
permit
UK police
officers to be deployed in Iraq.
461.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Lieutenant General Sir Graeme Lamb,
GOC
MND(SE)
from July 2003 to December 2003, described needing “about 90
policemen”
in July,
but six months later he had only two.406
He stated
that “… people talked a lot,
they
promised a great deal … in fact delivery was always the
problem”.
462.
Lt
Gen Lamb said that his “sense was there was no shortage of
individuals who
were
prepared to volunteer” but Chief Constables were “reluctant” and
“did not allow
them to
come forward” because they felt it would be a breach of their duty
of care given
the
difficult security situation.
463.
Sir Hilary
Synnott agreed that he perceived a “tremendous reluctance” from
ACPO
to supply
police officers.407
464.
In late
September 2003, both DCC Brand and DCC White expressed
their
frustration
about the lack of additional UK police officers in
Iraq.408
On 21
September,
in response
to being informed that the FCO was considering asking the PSNI to
provide
the four
staff he requested in August, DCC Brand wrote:
“… I don’t
mind where they come from as long as they get here ASAP. The
JCC
[Joint
Command Centre] is now being seen by the military as the only
current
solution to
the problem of soldiers shooting Iraqi police officers because of a
lack
of
awareness of deployments … They [the military] have everything in
place …
I made my
original request … 6 weeks
ago … If we are
only just thinking about
approaching
PSNI it may be weeks or months before the officers are able to
travel
and we
would lose all credibility with the American military … To remind
you,
this was
our idea … I urge you
to act swiftly and not delay any longer.” 409
404
Paper IPU,
3 September 2003, ‘Iraq Security Plan’.
405
Email
Kernaghan to Home Office [junior official], 4 September 2003, ‘Iraq
– Iraq Rehabilitation Group
Briefing
Papers – 4/9/03’.
406
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, pages 19‑20.
407
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, page 21.
408
Email Brand
to FCO [junior official], 21 September 2003, ‘Re: Police Training
plan’; Email White
to UND
[junior
official], 21 September 2003, ‘Re: Police Training
plan’.
409
Email Brand
to FCO [junior official], 21 September 2003, ‘Re: Police Training
plan’.
158