15.1 | Civilian
personnel
•
finance;
•
immigration
and customs;
•
infrastructure
and infrastructure security;
•
civil
affairs;
•
human
rights;
•
justice;
•
media
policy and regulation;
•
gender;
•
youth and
sport; and
•
civic
education.
He
described the spread of functions in Basra as “even wider”, given
the UK’s “overall
responsibility”
there.
254.
Sir Michael
explained that the extra staff expected to deploy between January
and
June were
likely to include:
•
30 more
secondees to CPA(South);
•
a DoH team
for CPA(South) and the southern governorates;
•
“political
process consultants”; and
•
FCO staff
setting up new diplomatic posts in Baghdad and Basra.
255.
Sir Michael
anticipated that numbers should fall to between 70 and 80
after
the
transfer of sovereignty, spread across the British Embassy Baghdad,
the British
Embassy
Office Basra and “possibly” other regional offices. He warned that
FCO human
and
financial resources were stretched, but concluded that plans for
the next
six months
were “sensible – and manageable as long as the necessary
resources
are
available”.
256.
Sir Michael
Jay also updated Permanent Secretaries on security and duty of
care
on 14
January:
“We would
not normally deploy civilian staff to an area as dangerous as Iraq
now is.
But
Treasury Solicitors have confirmed to the Cabinet Office that we
are complying
with our
duty of care if (i) we take all reasonable measures to mitigate
risk, at least
on a par
with other governments, (ii) staff are volunteers, and we put no
pressure
on them to
take up posts in Iraq, and (iii) we deploy staff for good reason.
We are
confident
we are fulfilling these requirements.”
257.
On mitigation
of the security risk, Sir Michael explained:
“The CPA
itself is responsible for CPA staff security. But our guidelines
and
additional
security assets bring security for British staff up to levels which
we believe
are
required to allow staff to do their jobs while mitigating the risk
to an acceptable
289