9.2 | 23 May 2003 to June 2004

761. After returning to London, Sir Nigel wrote to Mr Geoffrey Adams, Principal Private

Secretary to Mr Straw, to describe Mr Blair’s reaction to the visit report.417 Mr Blair had

noted:

“… there is a good degree of common ground between the UK and US … and

also that there are some differences, eg over the powers and size of the proposed

Consultative Council”.

762. Mr Blair’s view was that:

“… we should continue to be flexible and open on these matters. If a particular

solution emerges which works for the UN, Sistani and the IGC, it is likely to be

acceptable to the UK.”

763. Secretary Powell told Mr Straw on 21 February that the Kurdish Regional

Government had posted a four-page amendment to the TAL on its website, which

included a provision giving them a veto in the national government.418

Early in 2004, there was pressure from Kurdish political parties to use the draft TAL to

entrench Kurdish autonomy.419

FCO officials believed that Ambassador Bremer’s proposed recognition within the draft

TAL of Kurdistan’s Regional Government, which had been administering Northern

Iraq effectively for 12 years, was the right approach, although Washington took a

different view.420

A draft agreement on Kurdish autonomy simply acknowledged the status quo, making

clear that more complex issues would have to be addressed as part of wider discussions

on federalism by the eventual elected Constitutional Convention. Other ethnic and

religious groups were reported as being wary of any hint of special treatment for the

Kurds, equating calls for federalism with separatism, but these issues would have to be

resolved among Iraqis themselves in 2005.

Ambassador Bremer and Sir Jeremy Greenstock appeared to succeed in persuading

Washington on this, and the reference to the Kurdish Regional Government was retained

in the draft text.421

Sir Jeremy told Mr Blair in February 2004 that “US handing of the federalism issue had

wasted several weeks and cost a lot of Kurdish goodwill.”422

417 Letter Sheinwald to Adams, 23 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Political Process’.

418 Letter Straw to Sheinwald, 23 February 2004, ‘Conversation with US Secretary of State, 21 February’.

419 Minute Dodd to Sheinwald, 12 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Strategy Group’.

420 Letter Owen to Cannon, 3 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush: Wednesday

4 February’.

421 Letter Sheinwald to Adams, 14 February 2004, ‘Iraq’.

422 Letter Cannon to Owen, 18 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Sir Jeremy

Greenstock, 17 February’.

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