Executive Summary

119. There were significant differences between the US and UK positions, and between

them and China, France and Russia about the substance of the strategy to be adopted,

including the role of the Security Council in determining whether peaceful means had

been exhausted and the use of force to secure disarmament was justified.

120. Those differences resulted in difficult negotiations over more than eight weeks

before the unanimous adoption of resolution 1441 on 8 November 2002.

121. When President Bush made his speech on 12 September, the US and UK had

agreed the broad approach, but not the substance of the proposals to be put to the

UN Security Council or the tactics.

122. Dr Naji Sabri, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, wrote to Mr Kofi Annan, the

UN Secretary‑General, on 16 September to inform him that, following the series of talks

between Iraq and the UN in New York and Vienna between March and July 2002 and the

latest round in New York on 14 and 15 September, Iraq had decided “to allow the return

of United Nations inspectors to Iraq without conditions”.39

123. The US and UK immediately expressed scepticism. They had agreed that the

provisions of resolution 1284 (1999) were no longer sufficient to secure the disarmament

of Iraq and a strengthened inspections regime would be required.

124. A new resolution would be needed both to maintain the pressure on Iraq and to

define a more intrusive inspections regime allowing the inspectors unconditional and

unrestricted access to all Iraqi facilities.

125. The UK’s stated objective for the negotiation of resolution 1441 was to

give Saddam Hussein “one final chance to comply” with his obligations to disarm.

The UK initially formulated the objective in terms of:

• a resolution setting out an ultimatum to Iraq to re-admit the UN weapons

inspectors and to disarm in accordance with its obligations; and

• a threat to resort to the use of force to secure disarmament if Iraq failed

to comply.40

126. Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General, informed Mr Blair on 22 October that,

although he would not be able to give a final view until the resolution was adopted, the

draft of the resolution of 19 October would not on its own authorise military action.41

39 UN Security Council, 16 September 2002, ‘Letter dated 16 September from the Minister of Foreign

Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General’, attached to ‘Letter dated 16 September from the

Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (S/2002/1034).

40 Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 14 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Pursuing the UN Route’.

41 Minute Adams to Attorney General, 22 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting with the Prime Minister, 22 October’

attaching Briefing, ‘Lines to take’.

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