The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
915.
Mr Blair
urged President Bush to give more time if it was possible and to
avoid
at all
costs the bombing of mosques or the killing of large numbers of
civilians.507
He underlined
the importance of working with Iraqi civic leaders and working
closely
with Mr Brahimi.
916.
On 23 April,
Mr Blair received the first edition of all 15 “unvarnished
accounts”
reports
commissioned by Sir Nigel Sheinwald on 19 April, plus an additional
four
covering
essential services, oil, next year’s budget and Ambassador Bremer’s
recent
917.
Those covering
media, reconstruction, essential services, oil, gender issues
and
health and
education are described in Section 10.1.
918.
The paper
covering the Iraqi judicial system is covered in Section
12.1.
919.
Mr Dominic
Asquith, Deputy Chief Commissioner in the CPA, sent a checklist
of
issues for
Mr Blair to raise with President Bush.509
On
Fallujah, Mr Asquith’s advice was:
“… delay
for as long as there are negotiations in play; when military
operations
commence,
adopt a graduated response, starting with limited and
targeted
measures;
be ready to cease operations if a negotiating process can
recommence;
and put in
place an effective support plan for when it is over.”
920.
On the
political process, Mr Asquith advised that more effort should
be put into
defining
what the UK and US wanted out of the process. He
suggested:
“– a
Presidency involving a Shia, Sunni and Kurd politician, with a
Sunni or Shia at
the
top;
– a
technocratic Cabinet, if necessary with a political Prime Minister,
who is Shia,
provided he
is not Islamist or Chalabi;
– and a
‘chamber’ of 100 or 125 if that is the price of finding a home for
the rest
of the IGC,
with some legislative capacity (eg to approve laws) and the right
to
summon
ministers to account for their decisions;
– a
National Conference either before or after 30 June: in the case of
the former,
it would
have the added attraction of ‘endorsing’ all the above (on the
basis of a
package
presented to it).”
921.
Mr Asquith
judged that a National Conference would have the best chance
of
securing
the right outcome if Coalition leaders attended.
507
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, 23 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Fallujah: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with
President
Bush’.
508
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 23 April 2004, ‘15 Reports on
Iraq’.
509
Telegram
190 IraqRep to FCO London, 23 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Check List for the
Prime Minister’.
356