The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
423.
Mr Straw
noted that the Government’s supporters had “a clear preference” for
a
second
resolution but that “had not been seen as an absolute necessity”.
There had
been “good
progress” in New York in “gaining the support of uncertain
non-permanent
members of
the Security Council, including Mexico and Chile”.
424.
Mr Straw
described Mr Chirac’s public assertion that “France would veto
in any
circumstances”
as “utterly irresponsible”; and that Mr Annan was “equally
unhappy”
with that
development.
425.
Mr Straw’s
sense was that there was “growing understanding for the
Government’s
case” in
the House of Commons.
426.
In the
discussion, the points made included:
•
the
integrity of the UN process should be respected and enough time
allowed for
Saddam
Hussein to meet the tests;
•
the French
veto was significant because “it implied that France would never
be
prepared to
use force”; its approach “amounted to dismissing the evidence
and
insisting
on indefinite delay”. The French position had “undermined the
unity”
of the
Security Council;
•
a majority
of the members of the European Union supported the UK
line;
•
a “balance
had to be struck between striving” for a second resolution and
“being
prepared to
do without it if that was the outcome of negotiations”. It would
be
“easier” to
make the “political, moral and legal case” if such a resolution
could
be achieved;
•
although
the rhetoric used by the US leadership was “sometimes
unpopular”,
that “did
not mean that their policy was wrong”. President Bush had made
more
use of the
UN than his predecessor and he had publicly committed the US
to
a two-state
solution in the Middle East;
•
the
“atmosphere in the Middle East and more generally would be
transformed
for the
better” if the United States could be persuaded to publish the Road
Map
for the
MEPP; and
•
UN
authority for the reconstruction of Iraq was “essential so that all
countries
and
international institutions could contribute”.
427.
Summing up the
discussion, Mr Blair said that there had been welcome
progress
in the
Middle East with the appointment of a Palestinian Prime Minister.
That called for
a positive
response by the US. The French position “looked to be based on a
calculation
of
strategic benefit”. It was “in contradiction of the Security
Council’s earlier view that
military
action would follow if Iraq did not fully and unconditionally
co-operate with the
inspectors”.
The UK would “continue to show flexibility” in its efforts to
achieve a second
resolution
and, “if France could be shown to be intransigent, the mood of the
Security
Council
could change towards support for the British draft”.
474