The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
149.
Mr Richmond
observed that Dr Chalabi had “continued to try to interfere”
and
that the
“patchy follow up” meant that “we are in danger of yet again
appearing not to
be
delivering on our promises”. He cautioned that it might be
necessary to revisit the
original
de‑Ba’athification orders:
“… as they
give a government broad scope to arrest and detain suspected
Ba’athists
for
security purposes. Applied punitively, the order could legitimate
the type of
mass
arrests already proposed by some serving ministers. This would have
serious
repercussions,
especially among the Sunni community.”
150.
In a debate in
the House of Commons on 7 June, Mr Donald Anderson
asked
Mr Straw
whether the Government supported a statement by Dr Allawi that
“there should
be greater
progress towards finding places in the new Iraq for former
Ba’athists who are
not guilty
of human rights abuses”.129
151.
Mr Straw
told the House of Commons:
“As for
progress on the absorption of former Ba’ath party members who are
not
implicated
in the excesses of the regime, we strongly agree with Prime
Minister
Allawi, and
that view is now shared by the United States
Government.”
152.
On 28 June
2004, the CPA formally handed over to a sovereign Iraqi
Government.
In the 11
months that followed, the governance of Iraq was the responsibility
of the
Interim
Iraqi Government (IIG), headed by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. The
process of
establishing
the IIG, and its membership, is described in Section
9.3.
153.
On 30 June,
the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessed that:
“Former
Ba’athists are attempting to reorganise both military and political
structures.
The
attitude of the IIG to former Ba’athists will be key in gaining
support in Sunni
Arab areas
and discouraging hardliners from attacking the political process
or
coalescing
with Islamist terrorists. But Allawi’s efforts to draw Ba’athists
into
the
political process will need to be carefully judged if he is to
avoid alienating
154.
On 1 July,
Saddam Hussein and 11 other senior Ba’athists appeared in
front
of an Iraqi
court convened at the Camp Victory court martial facility in
Baghdad.131
129
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 7 June
2004, column 26.
130
JIC
Assessment, 30 June 2004, ‘Iraq Security’.
131
Telegram
006 Baghdad to FCO London, 1 July 2004, ‘Iraq: High Value
Detainees:
First Court Appearance’.
32