The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
securing
weapons that threatened Iraq’s security. The ISG would therefore
move from
CENTCOM to
MNF-I command.
798.
Mr Webb
said that the UK would continue to support the ISG, though
resources
were
strained. The problem would get worse in the autumn, when
reductions of scale
might be
desirable.
799.
Mr Webb
also told Mr Feith that Mr Duelfer’s report would be “a
significant political
event in
the UK”, in which Mr Blair took a personal interest. The UK
looked forward to
seeing a
draft in advance.
800.
Control of the
ISG transferred from CENTCOM to the MNF-I after the transfer
of
sovereignty
on 28 June.448
801.
At the end of
June, the ISG comprised 1,787 personnel: 1,722 from the
US,
54 from
the UK and 11 from Australia.449
802.
On
1 July, Mr Straw was advised that the only grounds for
internment after 30 June
should be
“imperative reasons of security or criminal
activity”.450
FCO legal
advice made
clear that
internment for intelligence exploitation alone was not sufficient.
The British
Embassy
Washington had already been instructed to raise with the US UK
concerns
about the
basis for continued US internments that did not fall into the two
categories
recognised
by the UK.
803.
The FCO stated
that restrictions on the activities of UK personnel in the ISG
were
unlikely to
affect its overall operational capability, but were likely to be
unwelcome to the
US military
at a time when US and UK resources were under considerable
pressure.
There was a
risk that, during a critical time for the preparation of the next
ISG report, the
UK might be
fully involved only in the ISG’s assessment work and missions
compatible
with UK
policy.
804.
The FCO also
reported that Dr Ayad Allawi, the Iraqi Prime Minister, had
expressed
strong
support for the ISG which he hoped would remain active for the next
six months
or so.
There had not, however, been detailed discussions between the ISG
and the Iraqi
Interim
Government (IIG) about how the ISG would operate. Prime Minister
Allawi was
reported to
be “convinced that WMD will be found”.
805.
Mr Ehrman
advised Mr Straw’s Private Office:
“We pressed
the US to address the future of ISG operations when SCR 1546
was
being
negotiated. They did not want to do so. Eventually they agreed to
the phrase
in
[Secretary] Powell’s letter [‘the continued search for and securing
of weapons
that
threaten Iraq’s security’] … The UK contingent makes up only 3% of
the ISG’s
448
Op
ROCKINGHAM Daily, 29 June 2004.
449
Minute
Smith to PS [FCO], 1 July 2004, ‘Iraq – Detention Issues and
the ISG’.
450
Minute
Smith to PS [FCO], 1 July 2004, ‘Iraq – Detention Issues and
the ISG’.
580