The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
143.
In early 2003,
Mr Straw still thought a peaceful solution was more likely
than
military
action. Mr Straw advised Mr Blair on 3 January that he
had concluded that, in
the
potential absence of a “smoking gun”, there was a need to consider
a “Plan B”.51
The
UK should
emphasise to the US that the preferred strategy was peaceful
disarmament.
144.
Mr Blair
took a different view. By the time he returned to the office on 4
January
2003, he
had concluded that the “likelihood was war” and, if conflict could
not be
avoided,
the right thing to do was fully to support the US.52
He was
focused on the
need to
establish evidence of an Iraqi breach, to persuade opinion of the
case for
action and
to finalise the strategy with President Bush at the end of
January.
145.
The UK
objectives were published in a Written Ministerial Statement by
Mr Straw
on 7
January.53
The “prime
objective” was:
“... to rid
Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their
associated
programmes
and means of delivery, including prohibited ballistic missiles ...
as set
out in
UNSCRs [UN Security Council resolutions]. This would reduce Iraq’s
ability
to threaten
its neighbours and the region, and prevent Iraq using WMD against
its
own people.
UNSCRs also require Iraq to renounce terrorism, and return
captured
Kuwaitis
and property taken from Kuwait.”
146.
Lord Goldsmith
gave Mr Blair his draft advice on 14 January that resolution
1441
would not
by itself authorise the use of military force.54
147.
Mr Blair
agreed on 17 January to deploy a UK division with three combat
brigades
for
possible operations in southern Iraq.55
148.
There was no
collective discussion of the decision by senior
Ministers.
149.
In January
2003, there was a clear divergence between the UK and
US
Government
positions over the timetable for military action, and the UK
became
increasingly
concerned that US impatience with the inspections process would
lead
to a decision
to take unilateral military action in the absence of support for
such action
in the
Security Council.
150.
On 23 January,
Mr Blair was advised that the US military would be ready for
action
151.
In a Note to
President Bush on 24 January, Mr Blair wrote that the
arguments
for
proceeding with a second Security Council resolution, “or at the
very least a
51
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 3 January 2003, ‘Iraq - Plan
B’.
52
Note Blair
[to No.10 officials], 4 January 2003, [extract
‘Iraq’].
53
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 7 January
2003, columns 4‑6WS.
54
Minute
[Draft] [Goldsmith to Prime Minister], 14 January 2003, ‘Iraq:
Interpretation of Resolution 1441’.
55
Letter
Manning to Watkins, 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
56
Letter PS/C
to Manning, 23 January 2003, [untitled].
22