6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
513.
Reporting on a
meeting held by Lt Gen Pigott on 8 August,
Mr Drummond informed
Mr McKane
that the US seemed:
“…
undecided on the importance of a front in the North … He
[Gen Franks] seems
to think
that a campaign mounted from the South could be sufficient but it
would
require
more resources … MOD will continue with their planning during
August using
514.
Lt Gen Pigott
issued updated planning guidance for possible military operations
in
Iraq to
Lt Gen Reith and MOD staff on 8 August.214
515.
Significant
points in the guidance included:
•
MOD’s
“planning posture” was “on the basis of being ‘as positive as
possible’
but without
implying premature political commitment”. Ministers had “not
yet
authorised
any expenditure” on force preparation.
•
The impact
of Op FRESCO needed to be factored into planning.
•
Maintenance
of operational security was “critically
important”.
Mr Hoon’s
“Intent and
Direction” [that only named individuals could be involved] was
“very
clear” and
the implications were “understood and accepted”.
•
PJHQ should
focus its effort on the issues which would inform judgements
on
whether
there was a “Winning Mil Strategic Concept/Plan”,
including:
{{a
military plan within an integrated political strategy;
{{intelligence
that was “good enough to give high confidence” that
the
elimination
of WMD, the replacement of the regime, post conflict
operations
and minimising unintended consequences, could be
achieved;
{{the
strategy for the North was “joined up”;
{{an
information campaign was “in place and effective”;
{{the
“Coalition dimension” being “adequately covered”;
{{CBRN
judgements affecting combat operations were “sound”;
and
{{arrangements
for logistics, “correlation of forces” and “rear”
operations
were
“sound”.
•
PJHQ should
“Continue to scope” Package 3 scenarios with the US
whilst
making it
clear that was “currently without firm commitment”.
516.
Updates were
to be provided for the Chiefs of Staff “Think Tank” on
6 September.
517.
The decision
to confine planning to a named list of individuals in the MOD
and
PJHQ
respectively (the “Centurion” and “Warrior” groups), and the
detailed planning for
UORs which
began on 22 August, is addressed in Section 6.3.
213
Minute
Drummond to McKane, 8 August 2002, ‘Iraq’.
214
Minute
Pigott to Reith and others, 8 August 2002, ‘Updated Guidance for
Possible Military Operations
(Iraq)’.
253