9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
530.
In a meeting
with Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Ambassador Bremer said he believed
that
only a full
constitutional process could meet the President’s and the Prime
Minister’s
political
requirements for Iraq.293
He believed
it was still possible for this to be done by
the end of
2004 if the GC moved quickly. But he conceded for the first time
that he might
have to
consider an interim Constitution, if it was not possible to create
the Constitutional
Convention
by indirect consultation rather than elections.
531.
Sir Jeremy and
Mr Richmond met Dr Ayad Allawi, the head of the
Iraqi
National
Alliance on 9 November.294
Dr Allawi
expressed serious concerns about de-
Ba’athification,
noting that “there was a difference between Saddamists and
Ba’athists”.
In his view
the de-Ba’athification policy was “incompatible with security in
Iraq”.
532.
Sir Jeremy and
Mr Richmond emphasised the Coalition’s intention to be
flexible
about the
application of de-Ba’athification, but pointed to the harder line
being taken by
the GC. Dr
Allawi commented that this was, in his view, the GC operating in a
way that
it believed
the US wanted. He wanted to call a meeting with the CPA to discuss
new
proposals
for using Ba’athists in the “security struggle” and indicated that
this had the
support of
a number of other Iraqi parties.
533.
On 11
November, Mr Rycroft wrote to the MOD, the Treasury, DFID,
SIS, the
Cabinet
Office, the JIC and UK representatives in Iraq and the US with
Mr Blair’s views
534.
Mr Rycroft
described Mr Blair’s view that elections in Iraq should not be
postponed
beyond the
end of 2004 unless absolutely necessary. He confirmed that
Mr Blair was
comfortable
with a timetable which led to:
“…
elections in around September 2004 to an Assembly which would
appoint a
transitional
government, with power and formal sovereignty then transferred from
the
CPA to this
government.”
535.
Mr Rycroft’s
letter also confirmed the secondment of an FCO/MOD public
affairs
team to the
CPA and directed that a British Office should be created in Basra
“to handle
trade
contacts, cultural ties, visitors etc”.
536.
In a
conversation by video conference with President Bush on 11
November
Mr Blair
said that the Coalition needed to improve its media handling. He
commented
that Iraqis
were citing this, as well as the economy and crime, as key areas
for Coalition
attention.296
The US was
holding “seminal” meetings in Washington on the
political
process,
about which Mr Blair would be consulted.
293
Telegram
176 Baghdad to FCO London, 8 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Sir Nigel
Sheinwald’s call on Bremer’.
294
Teleletter
Greenstock to Sawers, 11 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Iyad Allawi
Meeting’.
295
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, 11 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Next
Steps’.
296
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 11 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Video-Conference with President
Bush, 11
November’.
293