Executive
Summary
746.
US and UK
strategies for Iraq had in effect been on different courses since
the UK
decision to
focus its attention on MND(SE) in 2003. As a result of that
decision, the UK
had
acquired distinctly different priorities from the US. It was only
marginally involved in
the central
tasks of stabilising the Iraqi Government in Baghdad and managing
sectarian
divisions,
while it had come to see its main task in Basra as one of keeping
the situation
calm while
building the case for drawdown.
747.
For some time,
there had been indications of tension between the US
and
UK
regarding assessments of progress, and differing assumptions about
whether
plans were
needed for long‑term bases in Iraq. In May 2006, Mr Blair was
told about
“rumblings
from the US system about UK failure to grip the security situation
in what they
regard as a
strategically vital part of Iraq”.260
Gen Jackson
felt compelled to report that:
“The
perception, right or wrong, in some – if not all – US military
circles is that the
UK is
motivated more by the short‑term political gain of early withdrawal
than by the
long‑term
importance of mission accomplishment; and that, as a result,
MND(SE)’s
operational
posture is too laissez faire and lacks initiative
...”261
748.
In January
2007, the divergence between US and UK strategies was thrown
into
sharp
relief by President Bush’s announcement that the US would adopt a
new strategy,
of which a
prominent feature would be the deployment of a surge of US forces,
primarily
to Baghdad
and its environs. UK assessments of the prospects for the new US
policy
were bleak,
reflecting widespread pessimism about the prospects for Iraq. UK
strategy
continued
to look towards withdrawal.
749.
US concerns
about the differences in approach were evident. In February
2007,
Sir David
Manning, British Ambassador to the US, reported that Secretary Rice
had
asked him
“to tell her honestly whether the UK was now making for the exit as
fast
750.
The divergence
in strategies was also illustrated by the conditions‑based
process
through
which the four provinces in MND(SE) were transferred to Provincial
Iraqi Control
(PIC)
during 2007. Although each transfer was signed off by senior
members of the US
military,
there was persistent reporting of US concerns about readiness for
PIC, whether
the
conditions had actually been met and the wider impact of
transfer.
751.
The US was
also uncomfortable about arrangements made by the UK with a
militia
group in
Basra which allowed the safe exit of UK troops from their main base
in the city.
260
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 2 May 2006, ‘VTC with President Bush,
1615 2 May 2006’.
261
Minute CGS
to CDS, 22 May 2006, ‘CGS visit to Iraq: 15‑18 May
06’.
262
Letter
Manning to Hayes, 1 February 2007, ‘Conversation with the US
Secretary of State,
31 January 2007’.
103