9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
their
relative quiescence in the south) and, eventually, even perhaps
instruments of
Iranian
influence. But, regardless of their future direction, JAM have
already spread
a culture
of criminality, intimidation and violence in Basra, which it would
take years
of sustained
action by an effective central government in Baghdad to uproot
…”
496.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald sent his copy of the minute to Mr Blair and
Mr Powell. Mr Blair
commented:
“This is plainly utterly inconsistent with the CDS and Des [Browne]
view.
So who
is right?”
497.
In his weekly
report on 28 January, Lt Gen Lamb commented that he
was
optimistic
of progress, in particular on non‑security operations (for example,
industrial
regeneration).265
He
wrote:
“… after
four months in theatre I have found myself asking the simple
but
nevertheless
difficult question of just who is the enemy?”
498.
Lt Gen Lamb
suggested dividing MNF’s opponents into three
categories:
•
Those who
genuinely wanted to see an end to violence (“more plentiful than
one
would
expect”).
•
The
“architects of violence who would only wish to bring chaos to the
country”
found in
organisations such as AQ‑I, Ba’athist revival groups and
foreign
interventionists
such as the Iranian Quds Force and its surrogates. These
were,
in his
view, “not reconcilable” and needed to be “clearly identified and
singularly
prevented
from interfering in the process”.
•
Those who
benefited from a degree of chaos in the country, whom Lt Gen
Lamb
considered
were potentially “for turning – but may not have any reason to
as
yet”.
Within this category were a very mixed set of groupings, including
criminals
exploiting
the black market, the so‑called “honourable resistance”
Sunni
insurgent
groups (such as Jaysh al‑Mujahidin, Ansar al‑Sunnah,
Al‑Jaysh
al‑Islami
and the 1920 Revolutionary Brigade) and Shia militia (such
as
moderate
JAM), all of whom had expressed willingness to seek
peaceful
resolution.
Lt Gen Lamb reported that the MNF were: “focusing hard on
these
groups in
the engagement process to convince them that more is to be
gained
from a
peaceful accord. This is where risk needs to be taken and from
bold
steps can
progress be made.”
499.
On 29 January,
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary wrote to Mrs Beckett’s
Private
Secretary
to say that Mr Blair had noted reports of the US perception of
the situation
265
Minute Lamb
to CDS, 28 January 2007, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (243) 28 Jan
07’.
93