The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
736.
At the FCO
Iraq Morning Meeting on 4 March, Mr Chilcott described
Mr Brenton’s
report on
the evolving views of US Principals as:
“… a
further good example of even the most senior levels of the US
Administration
showing
themselves open to good arguments firmly put at the right time. We
needed
to go on
making these arguments.”322
737.
Mr Blair
produced a manuscript Note on 3 March setting out a list of
potential
actions to
help secure Security Council support for the second resolution.
Potential
actions
included agreeing:
•
a UN role
in post-conflict Iraq;
•
a
broad-based government;
•
the
humanitarian effort.323
738.
Mr Blair’s
Note is addressed in more detail in Section 3.7.
739.
On 4 March,
Mr Ricketts told Mr Straw that he and Sir David Manning
had
discussed
advice from Sir Jeremy Greenstock on the second resolution and
believed
that the
“best package” might include for the US to make clear that it
“accepted a
significant
UN role in post-conflict Iraq”.324
740.
On 3 March,
the AHGI advised Sir David Manning that Ministers needed
to
give their
urgent attention to the possibility that the UK could be running an
area
of Iraq
within weeks.
741.
The record of
the 28 February meeting of the AHGI was sent to Sir David
Manning
on 3
March.325
On the
question of the UK assuming responsibility for a sector of Iraq
it
stated:
“Although
military action is not certain, we may be confronted with the
realities
of running
a part of Iraq within weeks.
“The
question of geographical sectors, whether for security or to
provide civilian
government
as well, whether we should offer to lead one and how much it
would
cost, is of
increasing concern. The US military plan, which has been adopted,
has
the UK
running a sector covering a significant part of Iraq. In the event
of war, UK
forces will
end in occupying part of Iraq, but a sector covering four
provinces, as the
US propose,
is probably beyond our national capacity. There are concerns in
home
departments
about implications for their resources of any commitment to
provide
322
Minute
Tanfield to PS/PUS [FCO], 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq Morning Meeting: Key
Points’.
323
Note
[Blair], 3 March 2003, [untitled].
324
Minute
Ricketts to PS/Straw, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UN
Tactics’.
325
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 3 March 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
444