The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This Section
addresses the discussions within the UK Government
between
September
2000 and September 2001 on the UK’s Iraq strategy, in the light of
questions
over the
sustainability of the existing policy of containing Iraq, the
election of a new US
Administration
and concerns over the legal basis for the No-Fly Zones
(NFZs).
2.
The Section
follows on from Section 1.1, which addresses the UK’s Iraq
strategy
between
1990 and September 2000, and is followed by Section 3.1, which
addresses
the
development of the UK’s Iraq strategy from September 2001. Section
3.1 also
summarises
UK policy and thinking in September 2001.
3.
Iraq’s failure
to comply fully with UN Security Council resolutions over a period
of
10 years,
or with international treaties to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear, chemical
and
biological weapons, was seen as a challenge to international order,
the authority
of the UN
and the rule of law.
4.
On the basis
of its past behaviour, and the evidence found by UN and
the
International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors between 1991 and 1998, it
was
widely
assumed that, although the inspections had been successful in
dismantling and
containing
Iraq’s capabilities, Saddam Hussein’s regime had the intent and
much of the
knowledge
to develop ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction if it
had the
opportunity
to do so.
5.
In addition,
the UK Government and some others believed that, given
the
opportunity,
Saddam Hussein aspired to exercise regional power through the
threat
or use of
force, and would not be constrained by international law or
decisions of the
Security
Council.
6.
A policy of
containing Iraq initially designed to meet short-term needs had
been
extended
for over a decade. Sanctions were hurting the population of Iraq
without
having a
significant effect on Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Security Council
was
divided
about the benefit of maintaining sanctions and the way ahead, and
there were
doubts
about how long the existing policy could be sustained. Iraq was
confident in
continuing
to resist the return of inspectors. Internal opposition had been
suppressed
and exile
organisations had limited support. The strains within the
international
community
were clear.
7.
The
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, the
Butler Report,
concluded
in July 2004 that there was a “progressive reduction” in the Joint
Intelligence
Committee’s
(JIC’s) estimates of Iraq’s capabilities in the period to 1994/1995
but
“growing
suspicions and concerns” between 1995 and 1998.1
Those
suspicions and
1
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898.
188