12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
Coalition
partners to join his team and a number of key posts … have been
identified for
possible UK
secondees”.
141.
The paper
concluded that “the UK will neither be required nor able to develop
an
independent
policy on SSR in Iraq”.110
The
immediate UK priorities were therefore aimed
at seeking
to influence the development of US policy. Although the paper
recommended
that the UK
should “contribute personnel and expertise”, there was no mention
of where
those
resources would come from or what particular role they might be
expected to play.
142.
In discussion,
the point was made that in Afghanistan, UK influence over
the
approach of
the US to SSR had been limited.111
143.
Ministers
agreed that:
•
The UK
should continue to encourage the US to adopt a broad concept of
SSR,
and “to
address the employment of Iraqi defence and security personnel
urgently
through DDR
processes”.
•
UK
personnel should be deployed, including the creation of an SSR
secretariat
within
ORHA, to advise on cross‑cutting SSR issues.
•
The UK
should facilitate UN, international financial institutions and
other donor
engagement
in SSR.
144.
On 16 May,
Ambassador Bremer issued CPA Order No.1 which eliminated
all
Ba’ath
Party structures and banned “Senior Party Members” (the top four
ranks of
the Party)
from serving in Iraq’s public sector.112
It also
placed individuals in senior
management
roles (the top three levels of management) under investigation. The
impact
of the
de‑Ba’athification process is described in more detail in Section
11.1.
145.
Order No.1 had
an immediate impact on the senior management of the
security
structures
in Iraq, although Mr Slocombe observed in an interview in 2004
that: “Out of a
Ba’ath
Party membership of well over a million, maybe more, only about
40,000 people
were in
this category … only about 10 percent of the brigadier generals
were in these
146.
The CPA’s
records indicate that, of the 860 judges and prosecutors in post at
the
time of CPA
Order No.1, 656 were reviewed under the de‑Ba’athification
scheme.114
As
a result
176 were removed from their positions, with 185 new judges and
prosecutors
being
appointed to take their place.
110
Paper IPU,
May 2003, ‘Iraq – Security Sector Reform’.
111 Minutes, 8
May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
112
Coalition
Provisional Authority Memorandum Number 1 – Implementation of
De‑Ba’athification Order
No. 1
(CPA/ORD/16 May 2003/01), 3 June 2003.
113
PBS, 26
October 2004, Interview
Walter Slocombe.
114
Report
Coalition Provisional Authority, [undated], ‘An Historic Review of
CPA Accomplishments’.
93