3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
the
question of Saddam in the broader context of the Middle East as a
region in
transition.
Even then, though less clearly than today, I saw the disparate
issues
as
essentially part of the same picture. Therefore I made a major part
of my pitch
to George
the issue of the Israeli-Palestine peace process. To me this was
the
indispensable
soft-power component to give equilibrium to the hard power that
was
necessary
if Saddam was to be removed.”298
733.
The Inquiry
asked Mr Blair if there was “an explicit, recorded statement of
what the
UK’s
objectives were in April 2002”, and how they had been
agreed.299
It also
asked:
•
what the UK
objectives were in September 2002 and what process had
been
used to
revise those objectives between April and September;
•
how the US
had interpreted comments in his meeting with Secretary
Rumsfeld
on 5 June
and in his Note to President Bush on 28 July; and whether he had
any
concerns
that that “pre-empted collective discussion” with Cabinet
colleagues.
734.
In his
statement Mr Blair chose to address those points together,
writing:
“Though the
meeting at Crawford provides a convenient breakpoint for the
purposes
of the
narrative, I want to stress it did not result in an alteration of
policy. The policy
had been
clear since 9/11: we wanted to take a tougher line altogether on
terrorism
and WMD
globally, and sought to bring Saddam into compliance with UN
authority
… [T]he
Crawford meeting was … a chance to explain how best to implement it
…
Prior to
the visit I had studied the Cabinet Office Options Paper, together
with recent
JIC
reports. I had also had the Chequers meeting with CDS and read-outs
of the
military
interaction with Washington.
“The
objectives of our policy were not secret. They were set out in
numerous
statements
by myself and other Ministers …
“The
objective never changed between April and September 2002. It
remained …
to bring
Saddam back to full and unconditional compliance with UN
resolutions in
respect of
which he had been in breach for over a decade. It was absolutely
clear
that we
were going to be with the US in implementing this objective. There
can be
no-one who
was in any doubt about my determination on that score. I expressed
it
publicly. I
made it clear also to President Bush I would be with him in
tackling it …
I could not
and did not offer some kind of ‘blank cheque’ in how we
accomplished
our shared
objective … I would never engage in any military campaign our
military
thought
unwise or unachievable. What I was signalling was there would be
no
withdrawal
of support for something we thought right and do-able, simply for
reasons
of
political pressure, i.e. I was going to be steadfast as an ally … I
sent this signal
both
because I believed in the substance and because we would be right
alongside
the US
thinking from the outset.
298
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
299
Inquiry
request for a witness statement, 13 December 2010, Q2 page
1.
523