9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
7.
A Private
Secretary to Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, wrote to
Sir David on
23 May to
advise that:
“… the
Chiefs of Staff judge that the deployment [of 16 AA Bde] … is
likely to have
only a
marginal effect. It would carry significant risks – of our forces
being tied down
in Baghdad
and of an adverse impact on our exemplary approach in the
South.”2
8.
The letter
explained that the US military did not lack capacity to deal with
security
in Baghdad
and that it was “safe to assume” that if the situation worsened to
a point
where
strategic failure seemed possible “they would deploy the resources
necessary
to deal
with it”.
9.
The Chiefs of
Staff were therefore of the view that the deployment of 16 Air
Assault
Brigade
“would, at best, not ensure Coalition success but would rather
provide only
temporary
and limited assistance, the gains from which are likely to be
similarly limited”.
It would
not have a “strategic impact”.
10.
The Private
Secretary’s letter also said that “the United States does not view
such a
deployment
as necessary”.
11.
Sir David
Manning wrote to Mr Blair on 25 May that he considered most of
the
arguments
advanced by the MOD to be “spurious”.3
12.
Sir David
suggested that the MOD appeared to have “ventriloquised”
discussions
with the
US; the views expressed to him by Ambassador Bremer had been
different.
Nonetheless,
he did not think it worth challenging the advice, suggesting
instead that
Mr Blair
“urge DFID to press ahead with plans to set up the police training
school”.
13.
Sir David
wrote to Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary on 27 May, reporting
Mr Blair’s
decision to
accept the MOD’s advice.4
His letter
noted that Ambassador Bremer had
suggested
that UK forces would be welcome in Baghdad, in apparent
contradiction to
US views
quoted by the MOD.
14.
Mr Blair
was reported to hope that “US troops will now tackle the issues
with the
urgency and
efficiency indicated by your letter”. Sir David asked for a report
by the end
of the week
on “what the Americans are doing to deal with the security in
Baghdad, and
the steps
they are putting in hand to deal with police
training”.
15.
In his memoir,
General David Richards, Assistant Chief of the General Staff
in
May 2003,
reported that Sir David Manning told him that this letter “included
the biggest
bollocking
by the Prime Minister in writing that he had ever
seen”.5
2
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 23 May 2003, ‘Security in
Baghdad’.
3
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 25 May 2003, ‘Security in
Baghdad’.
4
Letter
Manning to Watkins, 27 May 2003, ‘Security in
Baghdad’.
5
Richards
D. Taking
Command. Headline,
2014.
209