6.2 | Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003

on the ground and, if the post-conflict phase does not go well, there will not be many

nations who will be prepared or able to take part.

“And finally, we shall need to return to this issue once we are clear how the

campaign is developing and look at our wider contribution in the round.”

696. The Cabinet Office took a different position on whether it would be

“premature” to take a view on the merits of sectors.

697. Before the joint minute from Mr Straw and Mr Hoon reached No.10, Mr Drummond

advised Mr Rycroft that “we need Ministers to decide on sectors”. The joint minute and

sectors should be on the agenda for the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq (the “War Cabinet”) on

20 March.252

698. Mr Drummond suggested that Ministers would want to agree the proposals in the

joint minute:

“… provided they are satisfied that:

• UK Forces will be capable of providing security for an area around Basra

including about 20 percent of Iraq’s population.

• How long will we have this responsibility, and what is the exit strategy

(benign security environment created, UK forces replaced by others). Will

we be able to limit ‘our area’ to say Basra by the autumn, when we want to

withdraw two-thirds of our troops?

• That the assertion that the transitional administration will handle civil

administration including humanitarian reconstruction issues is correct:

This is clearly the plan, but it must be doubtful that ORHA [the Office of

Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance] will have the capacity, and

therefore the troops on the ground may be called on to help. The UK certainly

doesn’t have civilian capacity to help govern 20 percent of Iraq.”

699. The invasion of Iraq began overnight on 19/20 March 2003. Military operations

during the invasion are described in Section 8.

700. Discussion of the issues raised in the joint minute from Mr Straw and Mr Hoon

continued after the start of the invasion and is addressed in Sections 6.5 and 8.

701. The transition from conflict (Phase III) to post-conflict (Phase IV) military

operations began immediately Coalition troops started to occupy Iraqi territory.

702. When that transition began, the Government had not taken firm decisions

on the nature or duration of the UK’s military commitment in post-conflict Iraq or

on the extent of the UK’s AOR. There had been no systematic analysis of the UK’s

252 Minute Drummond to Rycroft, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq Ministerial Meeting’.

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