6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

• a discrete contribution in geographical or functional terms – a second axis in the

north, which needed more work to establish if it was feasible.170

368. The paper outlined the two possible windows for military action:

• Window One between October 2002 and March 2003; and

• Window Two between October 2003 and March 2004.

369. The second was the preferred UK option, but PJHQ acknowledged that it was

“undoubtedly less attractive to the US”.

370. The Chiefs of Staff were asked for guidance on the direction and nature of

future planning.

371. Maj Gen Wilson advised Lt Gen Reith on 16 July that the UK was expected to

present a statement of intent at a US CENTCOM planning conference in Tampa, Florida

on 1 to 2 August.171

372. Maj Gen Wilson reported that it was expected that the UK capability “offered”

would “deliver the northern option”, together with Special Forces, air (especially tankers),

ships, command and control architecture and enablers. He concluded that there

were “more questions than answers, with too many issues of substance either not yet

addressed or ‘assumed away’”:

• On WMD use, the view remained that Saddam Hussein’s “ability to deliver

‘capability’ is unproven and widespread use thought unlikely”.

• Although there was “reasonable information upon which to target”, it remained

“a critical information shortcoming”.

• It was not clear whether detailed work had been done to assess Iraqi “red lines”.

There was uncertainty over what Israel would do by way of retaliation if attacked.

• The “Baghdad Stronghold” scenario was acknowledged but considered a

“possibility rather than an eventuality”.

373. In relation to the recent announcement of a Turkish election on 3 November,

Maj Gen Wilson reported that had “unsettled” the US, and US military planners had been

asked to “assess the feasibility of plans in a ‘no Turkey scenario’”. He added:

“Whether it [the ‘no Turkey scenario’] becomes a show‑stopper remains to be seen.”

374. Maj Gen Wilson’s advice was seen by Adm Boyce.172

170 Paper PJHQ, 12 July 2002, ‘An Analysis of the CENTCOM Plan for Military Action Against Iraq’.

171 Minute Wilson to CJO, 16 Jul 2002, ‘Planning for Iraq – Record of Conversation with CENTCOM J3’.

172 Manuscript comment [unattributed] on Minute Wilson to CJO, 16 July 2002, ‘Planning for Iraq – Record

of Conversation with CENTCOM J3’.

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