The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

501. He had also been told that he should “owe his allegiance” to the CPA rather than

the UK Government.271 Ambassador Bremer had appreciated and welcomed

that position.

502. Mr Bearpark told the Inquiry that Ambassador Bremer had described his role as

“like a chief operations officer in a private company”.272 That included responsibility for

staffing, life support and the flow of funds to CPA regional offices.

503. Mr Bearpark also told the Inquiry that, shortly after arriving in Baghdad,

Ambassador Bremer asked him to take on responsibility for all the Iraqi infrastructure

ministries with the exception of the Ministry of Oil.273 At that point, his title had changed

to Director of Operations and Infrastructure.

504. The Inquiry asked Mr Bearpark why the oil sector had not been included in his

remit.274 He replied:

“It was never, ever said to me officially – and it was certainly never, ever put in

writing, but every member of my staff … said that it was perfectly obvious that I

couldn’t be put in charge of oil because I really wasn’t American … [and] oil would

remain an American interest.

“So it was a very specific instruction from Bremer that I was not in charge of the Oil

Ministry.”

505. The UK’s exclusion from oil sector policy during the CPA period is described in

Section 10.3.

506. The UN Development Programme hosted technical consultations on Iraq’s

reconstruction needs on 24 June.275

507. The UK Permanent Mission to the UN in New York (UKMIS New York) reported

that Mr Cunliffe, the head of the UK delegation at the consultations, had set out four

priorities including agreement on a multi-donor mechanism for channelling external

resources to reconstruction projects. UKMIS New York commented that Japan, Australia

and the European Commission in particular wanted “an alternative to the DFI”.

508. UKMIS New York reported that the event was “a positive first step towards the

internationalisation of the reconstruction effort”, with the UN and IFIs now “proactively

engaged”. There was agreement to hold a formal donor conference, probably in October

2003. Donor interventions were “upbeat”, reflecting a widespread commitment to

reconstruction. But there were important caveats; donors wanted to see early progress

271 Statement Bearpark, 25 June 2010, page 1.

272 Public hearing, 6 July 2012, pages 5 and 7.

273 Public hearing, 6 July 2012, page 5.

274 Public hearing, 6 July 2012, page 71.

275 Telegram 1011 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 24 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Technical Consultations on

Reconstruction Needs, New York, 24 June’.

90