9.8 |
Conclusions: The post-conflict period
187.
One of the
most senior individuals displaying this tendency was Mr Des
Browne,
who held
the post of Defence Secretary from May 2006 to October
2008.
188.
Mr Browne
repeatedly downplayed the negative aspects of the situation in
Iraq
and failed
to ensure the dissemination of a full and unvarnished version of
the truth on
the ground
in Iraq; and that the UK’s policy was assessed and reviewed with
due rigour
based on
that information. Mr Browne should himself have proposed a
reappraisal of the
UK’s
posture and tactics in Basra in 2007, on the basis of the evidence
available to him.
189.
In four
instances, Mr Browne gave an unbalanced account of the
situation in Basra
to the
Prime Minister, Cabinet or Parliament:
•
On 11
January 2007, Mr Browne presented Op SINBAD and the US surge
to
DOP(I) as
being “entirely consistent”, which did not give a full picture of
the
substantial
differences between UK and US strategy.
•
Mr Browne
briefed a meeting of Cabinet on 25 January 2007 that there was
no
disagreement
between the US and UK on force levels in MND(SE),
downplaying
the
concerns being raised by senior members of the US
Administration.
Mr Browne
also painted an extremely positive picture of conditions in
Basra,
when other
contemporary accounts provided a different view.
•
From 28 to
31 January 2007, Mr Browne visited Iraq. After returning to
the UK,
he
continued to stress to DOP the positive effect of Op SINBAD.
Mr Browne’s
reassuring
report did not take into account: the strength of US objections
to
the UK’s
approach; the serious risk that the UK would have
responsibility
without
control in Basra, which was driving consideration of a
continued
UK presence
in Basra Palace; or evidence of the dangerous situation
faced
by ordinary Basrawis.
•
On 1 April
2008, Mr Browne gave a positive account of the reduction
of
corruption
in the Basra police to Parliament. This painted a significantly
more
positive
picture than contemporary reporting from those on the ground in
Basra.
190.
The UK had not
participated in an opposed invasion and full-scale occupation
of
a sovereign
State (followed by shared responsibility for security and
reconstruction over
a long
period) since the end of the Second World War. The particular
circumstances of
Op TELIC
are unlikely to recur. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be drawn
about major
operations
abroad and the UK’s approach to armed intervention.
191.
The UK did not
achieve its objectives, despite the best efforts and acceptance
of
risk in a
dangerous environment by military and civilian
personnel.
192.
Although the
UK expected to be involved in Iraq for a lengthy period after
the
conflict,
the Government was unprepared for the role in which the UK found
itself from
April 2003.
Much of what went wrong stemmed from that lack of
preparation.
503