14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
being asked
to do (expeditionary Land based operations) rather than what
they
might
have to do
(force on force operations across all three
environments).”552
1044.
On 29 June,
Air Commodore Brian Bates, Director Directorate of Joint
Capability,
produced
two papers for Gen Granville‑Chapman; one on rotary wing
operational
shortfalls
and one on ISTAR operational shortfalls.
1045.
The paper on
rotary wing shortfalls stated:
“The
Department’s BH [battlefield helicopter] capability is a finite
resource that is
required to
support a number of concurrent Military Tasks overseas and a
variety
of Standing
Home commitments. Currently the BH force is heavily committed
on
operations
and is recognised as a Defence pinch point …”
“A range of
factors have contributed to the current pressures on the BH force;
not
least, a
legacy of underinvestment in BH sustainability and the fact that a
significant
proportion
of BH fleets are operating in excess of DPAs [Defence
Planning
Assumptions].
The enduring nature of today’s operations, allied to a presumed
need
for BH
during any drawdown or overwatch period, suggests that this
situation is
unlikely to
change in the medium term. Other complicating factors include: …
the
increased
IED threat that had led to a tendency to revert to the use of
helicopters as
the default
option for protection where other means, such as properly protected
road
moves, may
be possible; and, a paucity of ISTAR assets, leading to an
increased
demand on
BH platforms.”553
1046.
The paper went
on to summarise the operational requirements in each
theatre.
For
Operation TELIC it stated:
“Five
Merlin …, three Sea King .., four Lynx …, and 3 [Helicopter]
(Broadsword
[ISTAR])
are currently deployed on Op TELIC. The CABHWG [Capability
Area
Battlefield
Helicopter Working Group], drawing on PJHQ‑led AFLRs
[Aviation
Force Level
Reviews], has established that current support is sufficient for
the
task. This
was subsequently confirmed by CJO, although circumstances that
could
necessitate
an increase in BH have been identified. The early stages of
transition to
Operational
Overwatch (OOW) may free up some lift but this is likely to be
absorbed
by emerging
tasks in support of OOW forces, OGDs and the need to
maintain
situational
awareness …”
1047.
The ISTAR
paper stated that the key shortfall in FMV was “likely to
increase
rather than
diminish” with the move to Operational Overwatch and the evolving
concept
of
operations in Afghanistan.554
Without
additional resources, the opportunities to
make
substantial improvements to the delivery of ISTAR on operations
were limited
to “process
enhancements” or securing greater access to coalition
assets.
552
Letter
Jackson to Dannatt, 21 June 2006, [untitled].
553
Minute
DJtCap to MA/VCDS, 29 June 2006, ‘Rotary Wing Operational
Shortfalls’.
554
Minute
DJtCap to MA/VCDS, 29 June 2006, ‘ISTAR Operational
Shortfalls’.
177