The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
“Less
encouragingly”, Dr Rice had implied that the US would not be
prepared
to expend
much political capital in securing Turkey’s agreement to a
UK
deployment
through Turkey.
1004.
The British
Embassy in Washington reported on 1 November that it has
been
made
abundantly clear to the US Administration that there were likely to
be difficulties
in mounting
UK operations through Turkey, and the NSC and Secretary Rumsfeld
had
accepted
this. Some senior voices in the US Administration were strongly
advising the
UK to
consider other options.395
1005.
In Washington
on 5 November, Sir Kevin Tebbit pressed senior officials in
the
State
Department, Pentagon and NSC to press the Turkish Government on UK
military
deployments
in Turkey.396
1006.
Sir Kevin
argued that a UK contribution in the North “made the greatest
political
and
military sense”, and that Turkish misgivings about a Kurdish state
and lack of
support for
Turkey’s EU candidacy were “misplaced”. He had explained that all
the
UK’s
planning had “thus far been predicated on the northern route” and
the UK “had not
considered
alternatives”. He believed other options “would present both
political and
military
problems”. The military package the UK was considering had been
“tailored” to
that role
and “was not something that could be fitted in
anywhere”.
1007.
Senior members
of the US Administration offered differing views on the
strength
of Turkey’s
concern. Those in the Pentagon and NSC suggested that the UK should
look
at other
options. One official in the NSC suggested that, if it was not
feasible for the UK
to operate
from the South or West, it was “imperative” that the UK should tell
the US
“as clearly
as possible”.
1008.
Sir David
Manning and Mr Powell were concerned by the position
Sir Kevin
had taken.
1009.
Mr Powell
asked: “Why on earth has he gone down this track?”397
1010.
Sir David
replied: “I wish I knew. The MOD seem to have their own agenda. I
can
only assume
they are mad keen still on their northern option (Package
3).”398
1011.
Mr Powell
wrote that he would talk to Mr Hoon.399
395
Telegram
1429 Washington to FCO London, 1 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
396
Telegram
1446 Washington to FCO London, 6 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
397
Manuscript
comment Powell on Telegram 1446 Washington to FCO London, 6
November 2002,
‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
398
Manuscript
comment Manning on Telegram 1446 Washington to FCO London, 6
November 2002,
‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
399
Manuscript
comment Powell on Telegram 1446 Washington to FCO London, 6
November 2002,
‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
326