4.4 | The
search for WMD
681.
Mr Duelfer
described the meeting in his memoir:
“Blair was
very well informed on the WMD issue, and I had the opportunity to
go
into
greater depth about my plans and tactics than I had with President
Bush or
Condoleezza
Rice … I highlighted that I felt it was important to take this
historic
opportunity
to record the reasons
for
Saddam’s decisions on WMD and to
understand
where the regime was headed …
“Prime
Minister Blair asked questions about the sources of information and
how
I would
arbitrate between the views of differing experts. He did not make
strong
suggestions,
but carefully inquired where I was headed and asked about
rough
estimates
on timing. I said I felt … that when sovereignty was returned to
Iraq
on
30 June, this would greatly affect ISG operations. I promised
to keep the UK
Government
fully informed.”377
682.
During a wider
discussion on Iraq on 9 February, Sir Nigel Sheinwald told Dr
Rice
about
Mr Blair’s meeting with Mr Duelfer.378
Mr Blair
remained concerned about the
nature of
the public debate, which Sir Nigel stated was “either there were
stockpiles
of WMD, or
nothing at all. We needed to publicise the reality of the position.
The next
interim ISG
report … would be very important.” Dr Rice agreed the need to
“keep
repeating
our position”, and to work together on the next
report.
683.
Mr Dowse
updated Sir Nigel Sheinwald on the survey of five sites
where
intelligence
suggested WMD-related items had been hidden
underwater.379
It had
been
suggested
during Mr Blair’s video conference with President Bush on
2 February that
the ISG was
hopeful of finding objects hidden in the Tigris River.
Mr Dowse reported
that
specialist divers had failed to find six rectangular metal objects
located by sonar
on 21 and
22 January and that the survey of a second site had not
located anything
suspicious.
684.
Mr Scarlett
discussed co-ordination between the UK and US with
Mr McLaughlin
and
Mr Hadley in Washington on 9 February.380
Mr Scarlett
said that, from a London
perspective,
there was an urgent need to get more detailed factual information
about
the work of
the ISG into the public domain. The next ISG report would need to
be better
presented
and less indigestible than the last.
685.
In a meeting
the following day with Ms Jami Miscik, CIA Deputy Director
of
Intelligence,
Mr Scarlett set out “the broad gameplan for getting some
balance back into
the public
debate on WMD”.381
“The key
was to get more facts into the public domain.”
377
Duelfer
C. Hide and
Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq. Public
Affairs, 2009.
378
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 9 February 2004, ‘Iraq’.
379
Minute
Dowse to Sheinwald, 9 February 2004, ‘Iraq WMD: Search for
Items in the Tigris’ attaching
Paper
[unattributed], [undated], ‘Retrieval from the
Tigris’.
380
Telegram 2
Washington to Cabinet Office London, 10 February 2004, ‘Iraq
WMD: JIC Chairman’s visit
to
Washington, 9/10 February’.
381
Letter Wood
to Scarlett, 10 February 2004, ‘Your Meeting with Jami Miscik,
10 February’.
559