The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
577.
One of the
accounts reported the purpose of the meeting as looking at
the
prospects
for developing the negotiations from a tactical deal into a process
that
delivered
strategic effect in MND(SE) and perhaps beyond.
578.
One of the
attendees reported internally on broad agreement that:
•
The UK
should aim to preserve the reduction in violence for as long as
possible,
because
even after PIC a return to violence would make sustaining UK
presence
in MND(SE)
difficult.
•
The
cease-fire would probably not survive JAM1’s release as part of the
last
tranche of
prisoners unless he had first been bound into a broader
process.
•
It would be
necessary to wrap the UK’s relationship with JAM1 into a
broader
process so
as to avoid the political risks of directly backing a JAM
leader.
•
There were
potentially strategic gains to be made from such a process,
including
countering
malign Iranian influence and bringing the Sadrists and JAM more
fully
within
Iraqi politics.
579.
The attendee’s
account said that the FCO had agreed to take responsibility
for
developing
a strategic plan, while the MOD would take forward the “tactical
deal”. DFID
protested
against short-term development projects initiated as part of the
agreements
reached,
which could undermine structural reforms agreed with the
Provincial
Council. It
was agreed unanimously that no reporting on cease-fire violators
would be
passed to JAM1.
580.
Mr Day
wrote to Mr Browne’s Assistant Private Secretary on 7 November
with an
account of
agreements reached at the meeting on the previous
day.270
He said
that the
discussion
had “resolved most of the outstanding issues” on longer-term aims
and the
negotiating
strategy. He reported that it had been agreed that:
•
the current
process of negotiation should continue with the aim of
minimising
the IDF
threat to the COB and “stringing out the deal for as long as
possible”
into 2008;
•
subject to
any legal constraints, the UK should be prepared to act as a
conduit
for the
releases of internees in US hands, if the US agreed;
and
•
Mr Browne
should continue to approve the release of detainees, up to but
not
including
JAM1.
581.
Mr Day
wrote that it had been agreed that the FCO would lead on developing
a
strategy
for wider political engagement in Basra, taking into account US and
Iraqi views,
into which
JAM1 might be embedded. Mr Miliband would take Ministerial
ownership.
The
strategy would “address the timetable for [JAM1]’s release, the
relationship
with PIC,
the prospect of provincial elections and the role of aid funding
(probably
270
Minute Day
to APS/SofS [MOD], 7 November 2007, ‘Negotiations with JAM: way
ahead’.
290