9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
940.
On the same
day, Mr Prentice met Vice President Hashemi in Baghdad,
who
attributed
the cease-fire in Basra “entirely to the ‘role of
Iran’”.465
Mr Prentice
and Vice
President
Hashemi agreed that action in Basra was correctly targeting JAM
first since
they were
“the most active group”.
941.
Vice President
Hashemi told Mr Prentice that he was urging Prime Minister
Maliki
to return
to Bagdad and call for a Political Committee for National Security.
He believed
there was
wide support for such a committee focused on Basra.
942.
On 2 April,
the British Embassy Office Basra reported that Prime Minister
Maliki
had left
Basra for Baghdad on the previous day.466
943.
On 3 April,
Maj Gen White-Spunner briefed Lt Gen Houghton that the
situation
on the
ground in Basra City had changed dramatically.467
JAM
appeared to be abiding
by Muqtada
al-Sadr’s call to stay off the streets; the curfew had been lifted
during the
day and the
streets seemed mostly calm and quiet. The resulting impact on
MND(SE)
freedom of
manoeuvre in the city and on the threat against the COB had
been
significant.
944.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner reported that MNC-I had re-ordered its priorities so
that
Basra now
sat above Mosul and was second only to Baghdad. Significant US
forces had
been
deployed to Basra to support the ISF operation:
“With this
influx, the US have recognised that MND(SE)’s current size and
structure
is
insufficient to deliver a result in Basra at the pace they require
and have asked
[for] it to
be reviewed. We should expect nothing less from a MNC-I Main
Effort. The
PM’s
initiative, whilst not what we had planned for, does now pose a
real opportunity
that we
must enable the Iraqis to capitalise on. A coalition-led, but
Iraqi-faced surge
over the
coming month would build on the Basrawi consent and optimism and
has
the
potential to dramatically reshape the security
environment.”
945.
US troops were
expected to remain in MND(SE) for at least a month. The
Deputy
Commanding
General MNC-I and Maj Gen White-Spunner had decided to
integrate
their staff
into a joint headquarters in order to maximise the coherence of
their efforts.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner wrote that:
“For the
next month we are jointly focused on delivering the very best for
Basra that
we can and
our approach is very much that the Iraqi operation offers an
opportunity.
We could,
possibly, end up with a more peaceful and secure city in the
coming
weeks …
Whilst we are getting on with this, I suspect that the UK needs to
answer
some fairly
fundamental questions. To preserve the level of effort the US
feels
is required
in Basra will require substantial resources, certainly beyond what
is
currently
available to MND(SE). If we are to provide these then we should
expect to
465
Email
Oppenheim to Prentice, 2 April 2008, ‘Meeting with VP Hashemi, 1
April’.
466
eGram
12405/08 Basra to Baghdad, 2 April 2008, ‘Basra – Update 1
April’.
467
Minute
White-Spunner to CJO, 3 March 2008 [sic], ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly
Letter – 3 April 2008’.
357