The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
386.
Sir John
Scarlett told the Inquiry that the Assessment “sort of logged the
picture
at that
moment, which was more or less when the ISG was seriously getting
going”.189
He added:
“So in the
end of June Assessment it was just stated that no munitions of
stocks or
agent had
been found for CW … That was set against the fact that even during
the
conflict
there had been continuing intelligence about tactical deployment of
CW. This
was early
on, after the end of the conflict, and it was still seen as very
early days.
“For BW it
was slightly different at that point because it’s important to say
that in late
April,
early May, trailers were found in Iraq …
“So in the
BW context, it wasn’t a case that nothing had been found, because
it was
thought
that possibly something pretty serious had been found, and of
course it played
into a
major line of reporting which was still being taken seriously at
that time …
“So
initially … it was said in bold terms, straight away, up front to
customers what
was not
being found and what might be being found, and at that stage,
emphasis
was placed
on it was too early to review judgments or change judgments because
it
was very
early days in the search.
…
“It’s quite
difficult to tell from the reporting notes going backwards and
forwards at
what point,
if you like, the psychological mood changed, because clearly almost
from
the
beginning when nothing was found, the possibility that nothing
would be found
was there
…”
387.
On
7 July, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC)
published its
report into
the decision to go to war in Iraq.190
388.
Among its
conclusions, the FAC stated that:
•
It was “too
soon to tell whether the Government’s assertions on Iraq’s
chemical
and
biological weapons will be borne out”.
•
The
accuracy of most of the Government’s claims about Iraq’s nuclear
weapons
programme
could only be assessed once the ISG had access to the
relevant
scientists
and documentation.
•
The 45
minutes claim “did not warrant the prominence given to it in
the
[September
2002] dossier because it was based on evidence from a
single,
uncorroborated
source”.
189
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, pages 58-60.
190
Ninth
Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session
2002-2003, The
Decision to go to War in
Iraq, HC
813-1.
498