3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
leisurely
in the current political climate”. Any timetable would “in
practice” need to take
account of
Dr Blix’s views.
310.
The draft
included only an implicit reference to regime change; “the market
will
bear no
more”.
311.
The draft
“also included requirements for Iraq to allow access to
humanitarian
agencies,
and for other UN members to co‑operate by providing assistance to
the
coalition
and information on sanctions busting”.
312.
The second
draft resolution reflected Mr Straw’s amendments to a draft
letter to
No.10
offered by officials on 5 September on which Mr Straw had
commented that the
options
were “too ‘in your face’ at present”.102
313.
While
Mr Straw recognised “the importance of engaging the White
House in
discussion
of the UN options and of a tough draft UNSCR designed to get the
inspectors
back in”,
he believed the UK should:
“… point
out to the White House that this is unlikely to be achievable and
that the
concerns of
Sir Jeremy Greenstock … must be taken seriously. You will
recall
that the
Foreign Secretary mentioned this to the Prime Minister at
yesterday’s
314.
The letter of
6 September summarised Sir Jeremy’s concerns and stated that
the
FCO was,
“therefore”, providing:
“… a draft
resolution which takes a different approach, namely determining
that
Iraq’s
failure to co‑operate constitutes a material breach/gross violation
of its
obligations
and sets an ultimatum for it to admit inspectors on the basis of
the
current
arrangements.”
315.
The text of
the draft resolution was that sent to No.10 by the FCO on 27
August.
The FCO
stated:
“Even this
approach will be difficult. We start from a point where the
other
13 members
of the Council will, at best, have serious doubts about the use of
force.”
316.
The FCO
concluded with a caution on timing:
“… no
action in the Security Council should be taken until the Russians
have been
squared. A
text as complex as the revised UNMOVIC mandate would require
even
more
pre‑cooking if it were to succeed … It would be far less difficult
to see that
102
Manuscript
comment Straw on Letter [draft] [FCO to No.10] attaching Minute
Pattison to Ricketts and
PS [FCO], 5
September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
103
Letter
Davies to Manning, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper ‘Draft
Elements for a UNSCR
on UNMOVIC’.
149