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3.4  |  Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002
leisurely in the current political climate”. Any timetable would “in practice” need to take
account of Dr Blix’s views.
310.  The draft included only an implicit reference to regime change; “the market will
bear no more”.
311.  The draft “also included requirements for Iraq to allow access to humanitarian
agencies, and for other UN members to co‑operate by providing assistance to the
coalition and information on sanctions busting”.
312.  The second draft resolution reflected Mr Straw’s amendments to a draft letter to
No.10 offered by officials on 5 September on which Mr Straw had commented that the
options were “too ‘in your face’ at present”.102
313.  While Mr Straw recognised “the importance of engaging the White House in
discussion of the UN options and of a tough draft UNSCR designed to get the inspectors
back in”, he believed the UK should:
“… point out to the White House that this is unlikely to be achievable and that the
concerns of Sir Jeremy Greenstock … must be taken seriously. You will recall
that the Foreign Secretary mentioned this to the Prime Minister at yesterday’s
meeting.”103
314.  The letter of 6 September summarised Sir Jeremy’s concerns and stated that the
FCO was, “therefore”, providing:
“… a draft resolution which takes a different approach, namely determining that
Iraq’s failure to co‑operate constitutes a material breach/gross violation of its
obligations and sets an ultimatum for it to admit inspectors on the basis of the
current arrangements.”
315.  The text of the draft resolution was that sent to No.10 by the FCO on 27 August.
The FCO stated:
“Even this approach will be difficult. We start from a point where the other
13 members of the Council will, at best, have serious doubts about the use of force.”
316.  The FCO concluded with a caution on timing:
“… no action in the Security Council should be taken until the Russians have been
squared. A text as complex as the revised UNMOVIC mandate would require even
more pre‑cooking if it were to succeed … It would be far less difficult to see that
102 Manuscript comment Straw on Letter [draft] [FCO to No.10] attaching Minute Pattison to Ricketts and
PS [FCO], 5 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
103 Letter Davies to Manning, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper ‘Draft Elements for a UNSCR
on UNMOVIC’.
149
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