The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
306.
Although the
covering letter from Sir Richard Dearlove’s Private Office
described
the second
paper as “an expansion” of the first, the paper drew on SIS4’s
discussion
with Sir
David Manning about a “possible way ahead”.148
307.
Addressing the
question “Why Move?”, SIS4 wrote:
“The
removal of Saddam remains a prize because it could give new
security to oil
supplies;
engage a powerful and secular state in the fight against Sunni
extremist
terror,
open political horizons in the GCC [Gulf Co-operation Council]
states, remove
a threat to
Jordan/Israel, undermine the regional logic on WMD. The major
challenge
would be
managing the regional reintegration of Iraq, without damaging
important
local
relationships. Working for regime change could be a dynamic process
of
alliance
building which could effect climatic change in the Arab-Israeli
conflict.”
308.
SIS4 proposed
a “new route map” where the key idea was that it would
be
“possible
to speak openly about support for regime change in Iraq without
compromising
the actual
project to support a coup”. He suggested a “policy
statement: we
want
regime
change in Baghdad and we are ready to provide air support to
coup
makers”. The
latter would “need to be Sunnis ready to abide by UN
resolutions”.
309.
SIS4 made a
number of other observations, including:
•
“To meet US
impatience a 12-18 month timeframe should be imposed.”
•
There had
been “a serious problem” with the legality of supporting coup
makers.
•
The message
to key partners should include “assurances” that the
approach
was “going
to be balanced, studied, planned and proportionate – better
than
bombing
now”.
•
Examination
of the interests affected and “means to compensate” them
–
“especially
Turkey, Iran and Syria”.
•
Consideration
of “international participation” in the military “task
force”.
•
Legal
examination of Iraqi liabilities and draft arrangements to manage
them.
•
“Promotion
of serious debate
within the
region on WMD:
costs and
responsibilities.”
310.
Setting out
“Our Aims for the Region”, SIS4 wrote that there were:
“… two
further aims: climatic change in the psychology of regimes in the
region,
a
pre-condition for progress in the Arab-Israel dispute … The problem
of WMD
is an
element in driving for action in Iraq. In turn, this should open
prospects for
Arab‑Israeli
talks, and, beyond, regional work to reduce the WMD inventories
which
threaten
Europe as well.”
148
Letter PS/C
to Manning, 3 December 2001, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper, ‘Iraq: Further
Thoughts’.
364