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10.2  |  Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
771.  In a briefing paper for the meeting, DFID reported that the number of people
displaced since the Samarra bombing had risen to 650,000.449 UNHCR estimated that
the total number of IDPs in Iraq could rise to 2.3m by the end of 2007. The number of
Iraqi refugees in the region had risen from 1.8m to over 2m.
772.  The trend was of “increasing polarisation” along sectarian and geographical
lines, which would have a considerable impact on the political landscape and made
a national response more complex. In contrast to previous displacements, the moves
were permanent.
773.  In Iraq, security had compromised delivery mechanisms, and weak Iraqi public
services had not been able to keep up with demand. The Iraqi Government had failed
to recognise that this was a strategic issue with long-term political consequences. There
was an increasing risk that militias were being seen by Iraqi communities as guarantors
of local security. The UK’s objective remained to build Iraqi capacity to provide security
and basic services; however:
“It will take years for Iraq to undertake the necessary reforms and develop the
systems for effective service delivery. There is therefore a humanitarian imperative
for the international community to assist in the short term.”
774.  DFID stated that it would contribute a further £5m to humanitarian relief operations
in Iraq and the region (bringing DFID’s total contribution to the crisis for 2007 to £9m).
775.  Other major contributions were:
Japan had pledged US$104m;
the EC had pledged €20m; and
the US had pledged US$23m.
776.  Introducing the DFID paper at the DOP(I) meeting, Mr Benn said that Prime
Minister Maliki remained more focused on security and his own political concerns,
but the UK continued to push the Iraqi Government to allocate adequate resources
to the problem.450
777.  The DOP(I) meeting concluded that the UK should lobby the Iraqi Government,
UN, ICRC and the IOM to step up their actions to address the crisis.
778.  DFID made further contributions to the international humanitarian response later
in March and in November, bringing the UK’s total contribution for 2007 to £15m.451
779.  On 18 April, a No.10 official advised Mr Blair that the UN assessed that the refugee
and IDP situation was becoming more acute.452 The Iraqi Government had pledged
449  Paper DFID, 7 March 2007, ‘The Humanitarian Situation in Iraq’.
450  Minutes, 8 March 2007, DOP(I) meeting.
451  Paper DFID, 4 November 2009, ‘Iraq – DFID Timeline and Financial Commitments: 2003 – 2009’.
452  Minute Phillipson to Prime Minister, 18 April 2007, ‘VTC with President Bush – 1800 18 April’.
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