The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

199. Secretary Powell responded that that would be “a brand new element”: Mr Blair

had “always said that if we had nine votes but a French veto he could work with it”.

200. Mr Straw reminded Secretary Powell of their conversation the previous day, adding

that “he was not at all sure that here would be only one veto: two vetoes would be

heavy; it was better not to vote”. Mr Blair had not yet made up his mind, but his “concern

was which course of action would be easier to get through the House of Commons:

no resolution because of a veto, or no resolution because of an expected veto”.

201. President Lagos told Mr Blair he needed more time to think about

the proposals.

202. In the first of three conversations on 11 March, President Lagos confirmed that

Mr Blair’s proposed approach could work but he wanted more time and was still thinking

about the precise terms.70 Mr Blair emphasised US concerns about delay and the risk

of an unworkable compromise. They agreed to talk again later that day.

203. Mr Straw told Secretary Powell that Mr Blair had made clear that the proposal

was the UK’s “bottom line”, and there was little flexibility in timing.

204. Ms Palacio expressed scepticism about any French suggestion that with

more time it could be supportive.

205. In a conference call with Secretary Powell and Ms Palacio, Mr Straw reported that

Mr Blair thought President Lagos had “bought the language on tests” in the proposed

“Side statement”, but “might try to share the language with President Chirac”.71

Mr Blair had made clear that the proposal “was our bottom line and also that there

was no flexibility on timing of the deadline (beyond 24 hours or so)”. Neither Mr Blair

nor Mr Straw expected any Chilean approach to France “to bring acceptable results”.

Secretary Powell and Ms Palacio had agreed.

206. Ms Palacio was reported to have said that France had been working on the

assumption that nine votes would not be achieved. If that looked closer, the French

would “change tack and instead play for time they knew the UK, US and Spain didn’t

have”. Chile was convinced it “could bridge the gap” and was “likely to come back …

with a French offer”. France would probably try to persuade Chile (and Mexico) that it

“might be able to sign up to our approach, providing” there was “a little more time”. But

France had “absolutely no intention of signing up to anything we produced”. Any French

“offer” to Lagos was “highly unlikely to be anything useful”. Mr Straw and Secretary

Powell had agreed.

70 Letter Cannon to Owen, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President of Chile,

11 March’.

71 Telegram 112 FCO London to Washington, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Conference Call with US Secretary

of State and Spanish Foreign Minister, 11 March’.

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