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9.8  |  Conclusions: The post-conflict period
The UK spent time and energy on rewriting strategies, which tended to describe
a desired end state without setting out how it would be reached.
UK forces withdrew from Iraq in 2009 in circumstances which did not meet objectives
defined in January 2003.
Objectives and preparation
3.  Before the invasion began, the UK defined ambitious objectives for Iraq after the
removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime from power.
4.  The UK’s strategic objectives for Iraq were described by Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign
Secretary, in a Written Ministerial Statement on 7 January 2003. The objectives included
the following definition of the UK’s desired end state:
“We would like Iraq to become a stable, united and law abiding state, within
its present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer
posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, abiding by all its
international obligations and providing effective and representative government to
its own people.”1
5.  At the Azores Summit on 16 March, Mr Blair, President Bush and Mr José María
Aznar, the Prime Minister of Spain, declared in the ‘Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’:
“We will work to prevent and repair damage by Saddam Hussein’s regime to
the natural resources of Iraq and pledge to protect them as a national asset of
and for the Iraqi people. All Iraqis should share the wealth generated by their
national economy …
“In achieving this vision, we plan to work in close partnership with international
institutions, including the United Nations … If conflict occurs, we plan to seek the
adoption, on an urgent basis, of new United Nations Security Council resolutions
that would affirm Iraq’s territorial integrity, ensure rapid delivery of humanitarian
relief, and endorse an appropriate post-conflict administration for Iraq. We will also
propose that the Secretary General be given authority, on an interim basis, to ensure
that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people continue to be met through the
Oil‑for-Food program.
“Any military presence, should it be necessary, will be temporary and intended to
promote security and elimination of weapons of mass destruction; the delivery of
humanitarian aid; and the conditions for the reconstruction of Iraq. Our commitment
to support the people of Iraq will be for the long term.”2
1  House of Commons, Official Report, 7 January 2003, column 4WS.
2  Statement of the Atlantic Summit, 16 March 2003, ‘A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’.
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