The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
be found:
Saddam Hussein had “had twelve years to hide the evidence”. Fewer
than
a dozen of
the 146 suspect sites identified as a priority by the Government
had
149.
On third-party
validation of findings, Mr Dowse reported that the UK
delegation to
the
talks:
“… made the
point that what constituted credibility was inevitably going to
be
subjective
– ie what was sufficient for the UK and US Governments might not
be
enough for
the audiences we really need to convince, including the Security
Council
(and UK
media). Like it or not, it was hard to escape the fact that a UN
seal of
approval
would be the most difficult for the critics to dismiss
…
“The
Americans did not seriously try to argue the point, but I doubt
that we entirely
overcame
the deep reluctance – particularly in the Pentagon – to contemplate
a
further
role for UNMOVIC.”
150.
Mr Straw
welcomed Mr Dowse’s advice, stating that it highlighted some
of his own
key
concerns, on which he had already written to
Mr Blair.75
Mr Straw
asked for a copy to
be sent to
Sir David Manning, and for Mr Dowse to prepare a draft minute
to Mr Blair.
151.
Mr Straw
discussed WMD with Secretary Powell on
24 April.76
UNMOVIC
was
rising up
the agenda quickly. The US and UK had argued consistently for
UNMOVIC,
setting it
up in resolution 1284 (1999) and enhancing its role in resolution
1441 (2002).
Mr Straw
did not see how they could now argue for it to be set aside. It was
important to
keep the
moral high ground.
152.
Mr Julian
Miller, Chief of the Assessments Staff, sent “lines to take” on
Iraq’s WMD,
agreed with
NPD, to Mr Simon McDonald, Mr Straw’s Principal Private
Secretary.77
On the
question: “Iraqi WMD: Where’s the evidence?”, the points made by
Mr Miller
included:
•
Coalition
Forces were actively pursuing the issue but the investigation
would
not be “a
quick process”. Saddam Hussein had had “ample time to conceal
his
WMD
programmes”.
•
The process
would be “painstaking and detailed: we want to establish the
truth
beyond any
doubt”.
•
“Given the
emphasis on concealment” it was “hardly surprising that
concrete
evidence of
WMD” had “yet to come to light”.
74
Minute
Dowse to Private Secretary [FCO], 23 April 2003, ‘Iraq WMD:
UK/US Talks, 21-22 April’.
75
Minute Owen
to Dowse, 28 April 2003, ‘Iraq WMD: UK/US Talks,
21-22 April’.
76
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 24 April 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with US Secretary of
State,
24 April’.
77
Letter
Miller to McDonald, 24 April 2003, ‘Iraq and WMD’ attaching
Paper Cabinet Office, ‘Iraqi WMD:
Where’s the
Evidence?’
454