9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
326.
The brief said
that “the priority for the MOD is to underline to the Prime
Minister
the need
for delivery on essential services in the South-East in the very
near future” but
stated that
there was a need for “urgent measures that will relieve the
military of tasks
unrelated
to security” because:
“… the
military’s role should be to set the conditions for others to
secure and
regenerate
Iraq’s basic utilities. While we can patch up utilities, we have
neither the
numbers,
capabilities nor the money to overhaul Iraq’s
infrastructure.”
327.
In a
handwritten comment, Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary added that
while there
might be a
short-term need for:
“… a surge
deployment of troops to protect the work – we should not agree to
a
major
‘symbolic’ deployment of troops over and above
this.”199
328.
Gen Walker
received a brief on the security situation in preparation for
the
meeting.200
A
handwritten note from his Principal Staff Officer added that it
appeared that
the FCO was
moving away from the view that responsibility lay with a
cross-Government
effort in
Iraq. He relayed the MOD concern that if more troops were offered
“the heat will
be less on
infrastructure requirements as driven by FCO/DFID”.
329.
Sir Hilary
Synnott sent a telegram entitled ‘Southern Iraq: What Needs to
be
Done?’ in
time for Mr Blair’s meeting on 2 September. He
wrote:
“The main
immediate need is a vastly increased effort, well beyond the
current
capabilities
of CPA(S) or MND(SE), to provide visible improvements in the
provision
of power,
water and fuel in a short timescale.”201
330.
Sir Hilary
concluded that:
“CPA(S)
needs to do even more to organise itself into a more streamlined
and
effective
organisation and we are doing this. In order to deliver the goods
according
to our
terms of reference and be a true co-ordinating authority we must
have …
more
resources, a new location very soon and protective
cover.”
331.
In a separate
telegram, Sir Hilary proposed “An Emergency Plan for
Essential
Services in
Southern Iraq” which would require “extraordinary and rapid
procurement,
contractual
and management arrangements, enhanced funding, more staff in
theatre
and the
active engagement and involvement of CPA(Baghdad)”.202
199
Manuscript
comment Williams to Hoon on Minute AD Iraq to APS/SofS [MOD], 2
September 2003,
‘Post-Najaf;
Meeting with the Prime Minister’.
200
Note PSO to
CDS, [undated], [untitled] attaching ACDS(Ops) to PSO/CDS, 2
September 2003, ‘Iraq –
Security
Assessment’.
201
Telegram 9
Synnott to FCO London, 1 September 2003, ‘Southern Iraq: What Needs
to be Done?’
202
Telegram 10
Synnott to FCO London, 1 September 2003, ‘An Emergency Plan for
Essential Services in
Southern
Iraq’.
263