The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
67.
Mr McKane
had an interdepartmental meeting planned for 19 August.
Mr Drummond
suggested
that if it went ahead, it might be “small and informal to consider
the options
for a press
campaign if/when Ministers take political decisions about
Iraq”.
68.
Mr Williams
had written a minute on 2 August which prompted Mr Edward
Chaplin,
FCO
Director Middle East and North Africa, to write to Mr Andrew
Patrick, FCO Head
of
Newsroom, that: “Although the dossier includes some good material,
it presents little
new
evidence of Iraq’s WMD to justify a move away from our policy of
containment/
deterrence.”31
He had
discussed the issue with SIS who took “the same view”.
69.
Mr Chaplin
suggested that special briefings for key foreign leaders would
be
needed “in
addition to any dossier”, to “convince them that the Iraqi WMD
threat was
real,
drawing on intelligence material more freely than would be possible
in a public
document”.
70.
That might be
extended to:
“… a
selection of opinion-formers in the UK … In private briefings one
could
be much
more explicit about the threat, using recent JIC Assessments (SIS
have
suggested
that this could be done without undue threat to sources), plus a
political
briefing
and, perhaps, a description of the damage which a relatively small
quantity
of WMD
could inflict in urban areas of Britain.”
71.
Mr Chaplin
also reported that another senior FCO official had pointed out the
risk
of “binning
the dossier, given that it has already been so heavily trailed”,
and suggested
a briefing
note could still be published “nearer the time of military action”
along the lines
of a
document on the “sins of Saddam” produced in 1998.
72.
Mr Chaplin
suggested the message would be that:
“… there is
still a serious potential threat to UK national security; action
has to be
taken; the
problem could still be resolved peacefully; but if Iraq pursues
this route,
military
action as a last resort is right.”
73.
Mr Chaplin
concluded that, if Mr Patrick and Mr Williams thought his
proposals
were “a
runner”, the idea could be developed with the Cabinet Office and
others and
submitted
to Ministers “after the holiday season”.
74.
Mr Chaplin’s
minute was sent to the Private Offices of Mr Straw and
Mr Mike O’Brien,
Minister of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and to Sir Michael Jay,
FCO
Permanent
Under Secretary (PUS), and other senior officials.
31
Minute
Chaplin to Patrick, 9 August 2002, ‘Iraq’.
126