4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
219.
Sir David
Manning visited Washington on 29 January for talks with
Dr Rice (see
Section
3.6).91
He was
accompanied by Sir Richard Dearlove. Sir David
reported
that
Sir Richard Dearlove had “briefed in detail on our
intelligence” which the US
Administration
“clearly find very impressive”.
220.
Mr Scarlett
assured Sir David Manning on 30 January that the
intelligence
reporting
was “consistent and convincing”, and there was no evidence
that
Saddam
Hussein was considering the renunciation of WMD.
221.
Mr Scarlett
also highlighted the need for the Government to take
seriously
Iraq’s
options for using chemical and biological weapons and
missiles.
222.
In addition to
the JIC Assessment of 29 January, Mr Scarlett
sent
Sir David Manning
his “personal observations on the overall intelligence
picture”,
which addressed
Saddam Hussein’s mindset and likely actions.92
“Our
intelligence reporting has been consistent and convincing. I have
not seen a
single
reference to Saddam even considering the renunciation of WMD to
save his
regime (and
probably his own life).”
224.
Addressing WMD
and inspections, Mr Scarlett wrote that Saddam Hussein
had
“followed
essentially the same strategy and tactics as during the 1990s”. He
had
“probably …
considered making a ‘partial’ declaration of WMD holdings”, but
“even that
has proved
too difficult, at least so far”. Mr Scarlett suggested that
would be “an obvious
tactic to
deploy at the very last minute” but, in his view, a “genuinely full
and open
renunciation”
was:
“… simply
too dangerous. It would remove the one weapon of last resort with
which
Saddam can
threaten his population and neighbours and send a signal of
weakness
to both
with possibly unmanageable consequences (for him). Given the
decision
not to come
clean, a ‘partial’ admission (for example in the 7 December
declaration)
would have
been a big risk. The chance of opening up lines of investigation
to
what was
still being concealed would have been too great. Better to submit a
flat
denial
leaving no loose ends. From Saddam’s point of view, that was
probably the
right decision.”
225.
Mr Scarlett
added that the Iraq position had:
“…
certainly made it more difficult to find concrete proof of his WMD
and leaves him
the
continuing options of concealment and delay.
91
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 30 January 2003, ‘Talks with Condi Rice
in Washington on
29 January’.
92
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: JIC Assessment and
Personal Observations’.
335