The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
to deliver
chemical and biological agents, these would be capable of
causing
large‑scale
casualties.
“In 1998 we
judged that, unless stopped:
•
Iraq would
be capable of regenerating a chemical weapons
capability
within
months;
•
Iraq had
the expertise and equipment to regenerate an offensive
biological
weapons
capability within weeks;
•
work on
650km range missiles which could hit important targets in
the
Middle East
might have begun. It could have been completed within a
year,
and
biological weapons produced in the same timeframe;
•
if Iraq
could procure the necessary machinery and nuclear materials,
it
could build
a crude air delivered nuclear device in about five
years.”
729.
The paper
stated that UNSCOM had “destroyed, or made harmless, a
‘supergun’;
48 SCUD
missiles; 38,000 chemical munitions, 690 tonnes of chemical agents;
3,000
tonnes of
precursor chemicals; and biological and chemical warfare-related
factories and
equipment”.
The IAEA had “found a nuclear weapons programme far more
advanced
than
suspected, and dismantled it”. Saddam Hussein had “consistently
sought to avoid
his
responsibility to declare his entire biological and chemical
capabilities” and had
“deliberately
and systematically sought to conceal and retain them”:
“UNSCOM has
discovered a document, which the Iraqi regime refuses to
release,
appearing
to indicate major discrepancies in Iraq’s declarations over the use
of
chemical
munitions during the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq also claims that it
unilaterally
destroyed
31,000 chemical munitions and 4,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals,
but
these still
have to be properly accounted for. And Iraq has consistently denied
that
it
weaponised VX, one of the most toxic of the nerve agents. But
analysis by an
international
team of experts of the results of tests on fragments of missile
warheads
has shown
that, contrary to its claims, Iraq did weaponise VX.”
730.
The attacks on
Iraq’s missile production and research facilities and
the
destruction
of infrastructure associated with the concealment of biological and
chemical
programmes
in December 1998 had caused Saddam Hussein “severe
difficulties”.
They had:
•
“damaged or
destroyed” 87 percent of the 100 targets attacked;
•
“severely
damaged” the base for the L-29 trainer “which could be used to
deliver
biological
and chemical agents”;
•
“significantly
degraded” some key facilities associated with Iraq’s ballistic
missile
programme,
“setting this back one to two years”;
•
“seriously
weakened” Iraq’s “ability to deliver biological or chemical weapons
by
ballistic
missile”;
160