3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
302.
The Cabinet
Office also provided a paper, produced by the FCO, on the
attitudes
of selected
third countries, which is addressed in the Box
below.101
The March
2002 FCO paper on the attitudes of selected third countries to
military action
in Iraq
stated that countries were more likely to be supportive, “or at
least neutral or less
hostile”
if:
“•
some attempt
is made to build UN legitimacy, ie a real effort to get the
inspectors
in; public
presentation of the WMD evidence;
•
the US are
seen to be making a major effort to revive the MEPP;
•
(with allies)
there is genuine consultation;
•
the US show
that this time they are serious about getting rid of Saddam
and
have a plan
that will work;
•
the economic
concerns of neighbouring states will be taken into
account;
•
they are
convinced that the day-after questions are being
addressed;
•
the campaign
has good prospects of being short as well as
successful.”102
The FCO
assessed that, of the Permanent Members of the Security
Council:
•
France would
be “difficult but not impossible to bring on board”.
•
Russia would
be looking for “an economic quid pro quo (on debt and
future
business in
Iraq)”.
•
China’s
interest in improving relations with the US “may overcome its
traditional
opposition
to interference in other countries’ affairs”.
The FCO
also advised that:
•
In the absence
of progress on the MEPP, Arab states would have “the
greatest
difficulties”
in supporting an operation perceived to be serving Israeli
interests.
•
Turkey would
want to know that the US was “focused on maintaining a
centralised,
secular Iraqi government” and would not want to be the only
Islamic
country
supporting the US.
•
Jordan could
find itself under the greatest pressure if military action went
ahead
given its
economic dependence on Iraq.
•
“Public
criticism but private neutrality” was probably the best that could
be hoped
for from
Iran.
•
Overt Israeli
support would be counterproductive.
•
In the EU,
France and Germany could probably be brought onside
“with
careful attention
from Washington and depending on the degree of UN
cover”.
Overt
criticism was more likely from Italy. Spain did not want an open
breach
with the
US.
101
Paper FCO,
March 2002, ‘Military Action Against Iraq: Attitudes of Selected
Third Countries’.
102
Paper FCO,
March 2002, ‘Military Action Against Iraq: Attitudes of Selected
Third Countries’.
441