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4.3  |  Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
627.  Reporting from the sourcing chain which had produced the “45 minutes”
report was withdrawn on 28 September.
628.  On 28 September, a senior SIS officer wrote to Mr Straw’s Private Office formally
withdrawing all the reporting from the sourcing chain that had produced the 45 minute
report.251 There were concerns that the source had coached the sub-source; that the
sub-source had fabricated reports; and that the source might not have accurately
reported the information from the sub-source.
629.  The SIS officer stated that the assessment of the impact of withdrawing the
reporting provided by Mr Dowse on 18 June still stood.
630.  At the JIC meeting on 29 September, Mr Ehrman noted that SIS had circulated a
letter withdrawing one of the lines of reporting on Iraq’s WMD:
“It would be drawn to … [Mr Straw’s and Mr Blair’s] attention. After the work of the
ISG was concluded, and SIS had completed validation of the sources, it would be
necessary to review the JIC Assessments circulated in the run-up to the Iraq war.
The results would be discussed at a future JIC meeting.”252
631.  SIS formally withdrew the reporting from Curve Ball on 29 September 2004.
632.  On 29 September, the same senior SIS officer wrote to Mr Straw’s Private Office
stating that SIS had concluded that all the reporting from Curve Ball should formally be
withdrawn.253 SIS and the DIS had reached a common position on the technical aspects
of the reporting in May 2004, which had been submitted to the Butler Review. They
continued to assess that the transportable production system described in the reporting
was compatible with BW production.
633.  The senior SIS officer also stated:
It was now not clear whether Curve Ball had ever told the liaison service whose
control he was under that he believed the system was BW-related.
Substantial UK and ISG efforts to collect significant collateral to conclude that
the system was BW-related had produced little that was concrete.
There were “irreconcilable inconsistencies” in Curve Ball’s claims for the
production process which meant that, notwithstanding its scientific coherence,
SIS “now have some doubts about the overall veracity” of the story.
Curve Ball had been a very difficult defector to handle and access to Curve Ball
had proved challenging.
251  Minute [senior SIS officer] to [Private Secretary/FCO], 28 September 2004, ‘Withdrawal of [name of
source] CX’.
252  Minutes, 29 September 2004, JIC meeting.
253  Letter SIS to Private Secretary [FCO], 29 September 2004, ‘CURVEBALL: Withdrawal of […] reporting’.
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