4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
627.
Reporting
from the sourcing chain which had produced the “45
minutes”
report was
withdrawn on 28 September.
628.
On 28
September, a senior SIS officer wrote to Mr Straw’s Private
Office formally
withdrawing
all the reporting from the sourcing chain that had produced the 45
minute
report.251
There were
concerns that the source had coached the sub-source; that
the
sub-source
had fabricated reports; and that the source might not have
accurately
reported
the information from the sub-source.
629.
The SIS
officer stated that the assessment of the impact of withdrawing
the
reporting
provided by Mr Dowse on 18 June still stood.
630.
At the JIC
meeting on 29 September, Mr Ehrman noted that SIS had
circulated a
letter
withdrawing one of the lines of reporting on Iraq’s
WMD:
“It would
be drawn to … [Mr Straw’s and Mr Blair’s] attention.
After the work of the
ISG was
concluded, and SIS had completed validation of the sources, it
would be
necessary
to review the JIC Assessments circulated in the run-up to the Iraq
war.
The results
would be discussed at a future JIC meeting.”252
631.
SIS
formally withdrew the reporting from Curve Ball on 29 September
2004.
632.
On 29
September, the same senior SIS officer wrote to Mr Straw’s
Private Office
stating
that SIS had concluded that all the reporting from Curve Ball
should formally be
withdrawn.253
SIS and the
DIS had reached a common position on the technical
aspects
of the
reporting in May 2004, which had been submitted to the Butler
Review. They
continued
to assess that the transportable production system described in the
reporting
was
compatible with BW production.
633.
The senior SIS
officer also stated:
•
It was now
not clear whether Curve Ball had ever told the liaison service
whose
control he
was under that he believed the system was BW-related.
•
Substantial
UK and ISG efforts to collect significant collateral to conclude
that
the system
was BW-related had produced little that was concrete.
•
There were
“irreconcilable inconsistencies” in Curve Ball’s claims for
the
production
process which meant that, notwithstanding its scientific
coherence,
SIS “now
have some doubts about the overall veracity” of the
story.
•
Curve Ball
had been a very difficult defector to handle and access to Curve
Ball
had proved
challenging.
251
Minute
[senior SIS officer] to [Private Secretary/FCO], 28 September 2004,
‘Withdrawal of [name of
source]
CX’.
252
Minutes, 29
September 2004, JIC meeting.
253
Letter SIS
to Private Secretary [FCO], 29 September 2004, ‘CURVEBALL:
Withdrawal of […] reporting’.
399