The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
626.
In its report
on UK operations in Iraq published on 10 August, the House
of
Commons
Defence Committee referred to its visit to Basra Palace in
June:
“We heard
that Snatch were very good vehicles, but they were old and could
often
break down.
Many had previously been used in Northern Ireland. They were fast
and
manoeuvrable
but not well armoured and were particularly vulnerable to IED
attack.
Similar
concerns were voiced by UK troops at the Shaibah Logistics
Base.”324
627.
The Committee
stated:
“We are
concerned at the increasingly sophisticated nature of the threat
and
the
consequent vulnerability of UK Forces travelling in Snatch Land
Rovers.
We welcome
the Secretary of State’s review of the use of Snatch vehicles in
Iraq
and believe
it is essential that this review be completed as quickly as
possible. In the
long‑term,
FRES may offer a solution to the difficulties associated with the
Snatch,
but its
introduction is too far off to offer an answer to current
operational needs in
Iraq. The
MOD should consider an ‘off‑the‑shelf’ purchase as an immediate
and
interim
replacement for Snatch, even if it does not fulfil the long term
capability
requirement.
It is unsatisfactory that the lack of capability was not
addressed
with greater
urgency much earlier.”
628.
Gen Dannatt
wrote to Mr Browne on 31 August:
“I wrote to
my predecessor [Gen Jackson] in July expressing my
concerns
about the
levels of protection for our patrol vehicles, the shortage of
intelligence
and
surveillance capability, the pressure on helicopters … That said I
am most
appreciative
of Lord Drayson’s recent efforts on the vehicle issue, but we
have
a deficit
to make up and the threat/response cycle is very dynamic
…”325
629.
The Inquiry
asked Mr Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister, whether there were
any
requests
for funding for armoured vehicles between 1997 and 2006, and if any
concerns
were raised
with him about Snatch Land Rovers.326
Mr Brown
said that the question of
expenditure
in Iraq had to start from the “one fundamental truth” that “every
request that
the
military commanders made to us for equipment was answered. No
request was ever
turned
down.”
630.
With regards
to Snatch vehicles, Mr Brown told the Inquiry
that:
“… the
point at which the Ministry of Defence decided that, as a result of
the change
in tactics
by insurgents against them, that they wanted additional and other
vehicles
to deal
with the problems they faced in the Basra area, we immediately
agreed with
the
Ministry of Defence that they should have the money …
324
Thirteenth
Report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session
2005‑06, UK
Operations
in
Iraq, HC
1241.
325
Letter
Dannatt to Browne, 31 August 2006, [untitled].
326
Public
hearing, 5 March 2010, pages 115‑118.
106