The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
why they
think it can work”. The US instinct would be to share only with
the
UK but that
would put “us in a particularly difficult position, increasing
the
appearance
of poodlism if we follow without being able to explain
adequately
ourselves.
We saw in the early stages of the Afghan crisis how bad
the
Americans
could be at appearing to have a coherent plan, and at keeping
allies
in the
loop. Doubts were stilled by good PR work by us, and above all by
quick
success.
But we and they should learn the lessons.”
•
France and
others to “eschew megaphone diplomacy” and to engage the
US.
“… our
chances of success with the Americans would be much greater if we
could
persuade
other Europeans to … be serious about defence capabilities. Our
chances
with the
Europeans would be much greater if we could persuade the Americans
to
put their
full weight behind breaking the current disastrous MEPP cycle, and
look
as if
they were doing so.”
91.
FCO
officials identified the need to pursue “the UN route”
demanding
access for
weapons inspectors as a possible way to avoid military action
while
establishing
stronger arguments for such action if necessary.
92.
The way in
which the minute was written indicates that the FCO officials
did
not, at
that stage, envisage military action would comprise a full-scale,
US-led
invasion.
93.
The minute
prompted a wider debate in the Diplomatic Service
which
identified
a number of key issues.
94.
Although
those contributions did not lead to the establishment of an
agreed
FCO
position, on the implications for the UK of military action in Iraq
and the
advantages
and disadvantages of different courses of action.
95.
On 20
February, Mr Goulty produced “a note on contingency planning in the
event
of military
action against Iraq”, which advised:
“Planning
for any military action against Iraq will need to take into account
the need
to prepare
the ground for, and minimise, the adverse humanitarian, diplomatic
and
PR
consequences of, what will be a widely unpopular move. Much will
depend on
the
duration of the action … and whether or not it succeeds in removing
Saddam.
The worst
possible scenario … would be a prolonged campaign which left
Saddam
in power
and allowed him to make maximum propaganda gains … In the
current
402