6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
161.
Mr Blair
subsequently confirmed that included if it came to military
action.86
162.
Mr Blair
also said that there had been “a general discussion of the
possibility of
going down
the military route”.87
163.
Asked whether
the UK would have made the request to be involved in US
planning
if military
action had not been regarded as a serious possibility, Lord Boyce
told the
Inquiry:
“… it
behoves any responsible military planner to make sure he is
considering all the
options
that might come in the future. If the Americans were going to go
down the
route of
taking military action in Iraq … it was very important for us to
understand
what was
going on at the earliest possible stage rather than being brought
in
at a late
stage where we wouldn’t have had any opportunity to say what
our
capabilities
are or how we would shape our capabilities … to fit in with
whatever
plan was
being produced.”88
164.
After
Crawford, the MOD began seriously to consider what UK
military
contribution
might be made to any US‑led military action and the need for
a
plausible
military plan for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s
regime.
165.
The MOD’s
initial thinking focused on the deployment of an Army
division.
166.
Mr Hoon
was advised that Cabinet‑level agreement to decisions to
deploy
UK Armed
Forces to Iraq would be required.
167.
In early
April, thinking in the MOD on possible options for a UK
contribution to
military
operations in Iraq moved into a higher gear.
168.
Following the
meeting at Chequers on 2 April, Sir Kevin Tebbit
asked
Mr Trevor Woolley,
MOD Director General Resources and Plans, on 3 April 2002
for
advice on
the implications of deploying a “Division minus (25‑30,000 with
enablers)”
169.
Sir Kevin’s
request, the advice he received, the fact that a division would
require
a minimum
of six months lead time and ideally longer, and arrangements for
Urgent
Operational
Requirements (UORs), are addressed in Section 6.3.
86
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 48.
87
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 59.
88
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 7.
89
Minute
Tebbit to DG RP, 3 April 2002, ‘Iraq Pre‑contingency Mind
Clearing’.
201