12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
Basra
Palace, six officers (at Inspector to Chief Superintendent rank)
whose role it was
to mentor
the police commanders in Maysan province, Nasiriyah and Basra.
There were
further
police officers in Baghdad working on future planning for the
police service in Iraq
but “they
had been all but marginalised by our US allies and were effectively
ignored”.
He likened
the arrangements for SSR in Iraq to “being in a rowing boat being
towed
behind a
massive troop ship going somewhere, the trouble was we had most of
the
charts and
plans in the police rowing boat”.
489.
DCC White had
deployed to Basra on 14 July 2003. He described the
security
situation
upon arrival as:
“… bad and
… getting worse. There had been tragedies … there was no
accurate
data of how
many people were being killed, but there were many people
being
killed. Old
scores were being settled. Bodies were being found in the
Shatt‑Al‑Arab
River and
in the parks and so on. So within the community, there was a lot
of
violence.
In terms of the threat against the Coalition Forces, it was also
rising … but,
having come
from working in Northern Ireland for 30 years, it was not, in my
opinion,
490.
DCC White was
accompanied by two MOD Police officers who would be his
only
UK police
resources for most of the next five months.434
He also
worked with Danish
police
officers, initially a contingent of three which grew to a maximum
of 15 by the end
of
2003.435
He told the
Inquiry that:
“… you had
the ridiculous situation where, as a very senior chief police
officer, I was
flying on
my own to the scene of murders … If you have only got one British
police
officer and
two Ministry of Defence police officers, for five months, what does
that
say about
the priority being given to the situation? Despite the fact – the
rhetoric
was: the
South must not fail, the South must be a success.” 436
491.
DCC White’s
lines of reporting were multiple – to Mr Kerik in Baghdad,
to
Sir Hilary Synnott
in Basra and to a junior official in the FCO’s UND.
492.
Despite DCC
White initially being offered an operational role, he was
subsequently
briefed in
London that his role was to be “primarily as policing adviser” but
eventually he
might
become police commander before handing over to the Iraqi
police.437
His first
task
was to
conduct a training needs analysis for MND(SE).
433
Public
hearing, 21 July 2010, pages 17‑18.
434
Statement
White, 20 June 2010, page 11.
435
Public
hearing, 21 July 2010, page 24.
436
Public
hearing, 21 July 2010, pages 32‑33.
437
Statement,
20 June 2010, page 5.
163